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ABSTRACT
The rapid development of Internet Technology has enabled convenient access
to large amount of business transactions data and has advocated the era of
\fact-based" decision-making. An integrated \fact-based" decision-making
process consists of three phases : data collecting, pattern-seeking, and per-
formance. Motivated by the importance of understanding the integrated
\fact-based" decision process, I investigate three fundamental questions with
focuses on dierent phases of the process.
 Are there simple and universal patterns when people make choices?
 How to utilize limited (insucient) data to design a robust service
system to ensure good performance under all possible situations?
 How system design aects behavioral patterns?
This dissertation adopts a multi-theoretic and multi-disciplinary approach
to oer fresh insights on \fact-based" decision-making. I investigate three
topics to tackle these questions. The rst topic models a universal choice
rule: the small number phenomenon. The second topic solves a robust ap-
pointment scheduling problem using a parsimonious set of information on the
consultation durations. The third topic explores how information complexity
and pattern recognition aect people's perception of randomness.
Abstract xi
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1. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, companies are confronting unprecedented challenges amid macroe-
conomics downturn, nancial crisis, forces of globalization, ercely compet-
itive market, ever-demanding investors and customers. The basis for com-
petition lies in the capability to make smarter decisions and design/execute
high-performance business processes. Smarter decisions create value through
higher eciency or greater eectiveness, like reducing cost, increasing sales,
lowering the risk, better allocation of resources and enhancing customer sat-
isfaction. (cf.Davenport and Harris (2006), Laursen and Thorlund (2010)
etc.) A thorough study on the performance of a range of companies in var-
ious industries from 1965 to 1995 concluded that a series of good decisions
laid solid foundations for many companies in the study (Collins (2001)).
The rapid development of IT system has enabled convenient access to
large amount of business transactions data and has advocated the era of \fact-
based" decision-making. The nancial crisis revealed the price of ungrounded
assumptions. Good decisions ow from a consistent and thorough eort to
confront \the brutal facts" (Collins (2001)). Extensive explorations of the
data helps a company to identify the trends and patterns of its customers'
behaviors, make predictive models and take prompt actions (e.g., re-designing
its service system) to increase its protability. The famous \beer and diapers"
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phenomenon provides an excellent example on the benets of data utilization.
A US supermarket chain found a strong correlation between sales of beer and
diapers through an investigation of their check-out receipts. This pattern
was then readily exploited by displaying the two products side by side on the
shelves. It would have been dicult to hypothesize through common sense
the correlations of sales between two seemingly unrelated products without
checking the sales data. Yet most companies sit on a priceless mountain of
data, but fail to utilize it in any meaningful way (Davenport et al. (2010)).
Therefore, the capacity to exploit the data and make fact-based, real-time
decisions is crucial for a company to gain a competitive edge.
As a decision support system (DSS), Business Analytics (BA) is dened
as \the continuous and iterative exploration and investigation of past busi-
ness performance to gain insights and drive business planning". BA enables
companies to aggressively leverage huge, noisy and messy data in key busi-
ness decisions and promptly react to changing conditions around them. By
delivering insights gleaned from data about customers, suppliers, operations,
performance, and more, BA gives companies the tools to tackle complex
business problem (SAS white paper). A survey conducted by Davenport and
Harris (2006) conrmed a signicant correlation between the adoption of
BA system and high performance of companies.
Adoptions of BA systems can now be seen in many business domains.
In health-care, for example, computer-based program is used to keep track
of patients' electronic medical records (EMRs). EMR holds great promise
to enhance eciency, reduce costs and errors, and make records available
anytime, anywhere. Analytical tools can be used to determine the optimal
1. Introduction 3
operating room usage by specialty, scheduling appointment, explore clinical
outcomes and risk tolerance to improve overall quality of patient care. Like-
wise, a BA system can create value for hospitality and gaming industry. From
predicting demand to improving inventory and stang level, to determining
the optimal mix of tables at a restaurant, to simulating front desk before a
redesign, BA can help with better understand operations to make decisions
that increase revenues and prots.
An integrated fact-based decision-making process consists of three phases
(see Figure 1.1): data, patterns, and performance.
Fig. 1.1: The close loop of the integrated process in fact-based decision-making
Collecting relevant data to analyze a system and achieve certain target
is the rst and foremost phase of fact-based decision-making. Due to the fact
most data are obnoxiously dirty and messy, one challenge of this phase is to
acquire the right data, and if not, how to obtain cleaner data.
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When (re-)designing a service system, prediction on customers' behav-
iors is crucial. Identifying patterns of a system is the starting point for
improving decision-making and enhancing customer experience. In the sec-
ond phase, patterns are to be sought from data, using various statistical tools
(e.g. time series analysis, econometrics), to tell what is more likely to happen
in the future. Once the future becomes more predictable, we can make ef-
fective plans accordingly or conduct more thorough analysis to optimize the
outcomes. For example, Progressive Insure found that nancial irresponsi-
bility predicts reckless driving. They thus use customers' credit reports data
as input to optimally provide oers and price dierent customers.
Phase III lies in eective performances{making best decisions and taking
best actions. In this phrase, predictive model are to be built by incorporating
outcomes in the second phrase, and approaches like optimization or simula-
tion are to be used to nd the best of all reasonable solutions to achieve
certain target, like minimizing cost, maximizing revenue or best allocating
limited resources etc.
An integrated \fact-based" decision-making is an iterative, and recursive
process. So, it is important to return to phase I to close the loop. Once the
system is optimally re-designed, the performance of the new system should be
constantly monitored and new data should be collected and analyzed to iden-
tify new patterns. This iterative process not only keep track of performance
of the new system but also enable agile responses to changing conditions.
Driven by the wave of the \fact-based" decision-making, in this disser-
tation, I study three fundamental questions with dierent focuses on the
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integrated process:
 Whether there exists a simple and universal choice rule that depicts
people's choice pattern? (with focus on Phase II)?
 How could we leverage limited (insucient) data to glean patterns and
design robust service system ensuring good performance under all pos-
sible situations? (with focus on Phase III)?
 How would dierent system designs aect people's behavioral patterns,
especially, perception of randomness when uncertainty is involved in the
system (with focus on the close loop)?
These questions are tackled by adopting a mix of research methodologies
like conic programming, lab experiments, econometric model, simulation etc.,
and explore profound implications of the results in dierent business domains.
Adopting multi-theoretic and multi-disciplinary approach, the contribution
of this dissertation lies in bringing out fresh insights and opening new avenue
for future research in the integrated fact-based decision-making.
1.1 Structure of the Dissertation
This dissertation is structured as three separate topics associated with dier-
ent focuses on the integrated fact-based decision-making process. The three
topics have separate theoretical underpinnings and implications in practice,
and have contributed to the three fundamental question raised.
The rst topic investigates an universal pattern revealed when people
make choices: The small number phenomenon. I quantify this phenomenon
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and examine its relation to the classical Benford's law. I use this connection
to develop a choice model, and explore its implications in setting the appro-
priate sales limit in xed-odd lottery games. The second topic starts with
historical data on patients' consultations and develops a convex programming
approach to solve a general class of robust appointment scheduling problem
in a single server facility, using a \representative" worst case distribution
matching the prescribed mean and covariance estimates of the service dura-
tions of the patients, to determine the optimal schedule and sequence. The
third topic is to explore in depth how the deeply embedded human nature{
pattern seeking{ shapes the perceptions of randomness. I create a simple
economic setting in which a sequence of random outcomes are generated and
build a Bayesian Updating model to explore conditions under which the Hot-
hand Fallacy appears. I collect two sets of eld data from gaming industry
to provide a solid foundation and verication of the insights gained from the
model. These results have important implications in problem gambling, risk
management, and lab experiments where random outcomes are involved.
2. TOPIC 1: SMALL NUMBER PHENOMENON
2.1 Abstract
In xed-odds numbers games, the prizes and the odds of winning are known
at the time of placement of the wager. Both players and operators are subject
to the vagaries of luck in such games. Most game operators limit their liability
exposure by imposing a sales limit on the bets received for each bet type, at
the risk of losing the rejected bets to the underground operators. This raises
a question - how should the game operator set the appropriate sales limit?
We argue that the choice of the sales limit is intimately related to the
ways players select numbers to bet on in the games. There are ample empir-
ical evidence suggesting that players do not choose all numbers with equal
probability, but have a tendency to bet on (small) numbers that are closely
related to events around them (e.g., birth dates, addresses, etc.). To the best
of our knowledge, this is the rst paper to quantify this phenomenon and
examine its relation to the classical Benford's law. We use this connection to
develop a choice model, and propose a method to set the appropriate sales
limit in these games.
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2.2 Introduction
Gambling is probably one of the oldest inventions in human history. In
the ancient past, it was often organized around a ght between tribesmen.
This ancient game of skill has proliferated into the dierent sports betting
games that are now commonly played in many countries. Gambling can also
take the form of a game of chance where the winners are determined via an
external event - a toss of bones, whoever draws the short straw, and so on. In
fact, such games are now routinely played at a national or state level, where
players bet on which prize-winning numbers will be drawn using mechanical
devices (cf. Lafaille and Simonis (2005)).
In many countries, number lotteries have become a popular source of
revenue for governments. In 2005, the Hong Kong Jockey Club paid close
to HK$12.4 billion to the SAR government in betting duties and prots tax.
This is close to 8.6% of the total tax collected by the Inland Revenue Depart-
ment of Hong Kong that year. In the same year, the Singapore government
took in S$1.05 billion from the gaming operators in betting duties, against
a total tax revenue of close to S$17 billion. These games are also popular
in the West. A recent survey by the licensed operator of the UK National
Lottery, Camelot, found that as many as 69% of the adult population in
Britain played the lottery in 2005-06.1 On the other hand, while there is no
national lottery in the US, similar games are now played in more than 30
states in the country.
There are many ways in which number lottery games can be organized.
1 The BBC news article on this can be accessed at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6174648.stm
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In a parimutuel game, the players bet on the outcome of the draw of (random)
prize-winning numbers, with the winner drawing a xed portion of the total
amount of bets received. The payout for the winners in such games depends
on the total amount of bets received and the total number of winners. On the
other hand, in a xed-odds game, the winner receives a xed payout for each
winning wager, and the total payout for the winner is proportional to the
amount of the wagers he makes in the game. For a xed-odds game, the prize
is xed for each ticket, and hence the return for each player does not depend
on how other players bet. However, the game operator now bears the risk of
paying out a large sum in prizes if a very popular number is chosen as the
winning number. Most game operators handle the risk exposure issue in their
xed-odds numbers games by imposing a liability limit on the sales of each
number - all future bets on those numbers with accumulated sales hitting
the limit will be rejected. This raises an associated question - how should
a game operator set the liability limit? Note that this issue is particularly
important to legalized game operator as a large chunk of their sales will have
to be returned to the government as tax revenues at the end of each year.
This prevents the operator from building up a large reserve to absorb the
exposure risk.
Teo and Leong (2002) used the Markowitz model to argue that it is
reasonable to use a common sales limit for all numbers/bet-types in the game.
They exploited the design of a popular four-digit numbers game played in
Singapore to demonstrate the benets of risk pooling in the liability limits
management system. However, they focused mainly on internal risk control
mechanism and did not study the impact of external demand distribution
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(i.e., how players select numbers) on the game. Interestingly, this turns out
to have a huge impact on the eectiveness of the risk control mechanism.
2.2.1 Benford's Law and Number Selection in Fixed-Odds Numbers Game
There are numerous studies in the gaming literature on lottery numbers se-
lection among the players. One group of studies (e.g., Simon (1999), Henze
(1997), Haigh (1997), and Ziemba et al. (1986)) focuses on the lotto games
(where players compete to pick, for instance, 6 winning numbers out of 45),
and has revealed many interesting behavioral patterns showing how the play-
ers select their numbers. The most striking conclusion from these studies is
that the players do not select their numbers randomly; that is, not all num-
bers are chosen with equal likelihood, and there is a tendency to select \aus-
picious" numbers (for instance, the number 7 is routinely chosen by players
in the game in the UK; numbers below 31 are more popular than numbers
above 31, etc.). Table 2.1 shows the proportion of bets received on each
number from 1-45 (ranked from highest to lowest proportions), in a 1996
powerball game played in the UK (Tijms (2007)).
Another group of studies (Cherno (1999), Halpern and Devereaux (1989))
focuses on the numbers game (where the players compete to pick the winning
3-digit or 4-digit number), which is also known as Pick-3 or Pick-4 in many
states in the US. Halpern and Devereaux (1989) also observed that players
in Pennsylvania favor small numbers in the 3-digit numbers game, where the
winning number is drawn randomly from among the numbers 000 to 999.
They observed that the bet volumes decrease rapidly from numbers in the
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rank number proportion rank number proportion rank number proportion
1 7 0.036 16 25 0.026 31 20 0.019
2 9 0.033 17 15 0.025 32 33 0.018
3 5 0.033 18 21 0.025 33 35 0.016
4 3 0.033 19 17 0.024 34 32 0.015
5 11 0.031 20 16 0.024 35 40 0.015
6 12 0.030 21 26 0.024 36 34 0.014
7 8 0.030 22 14 0.024 37 42 0.014
8 4 0.029 23 24 0.024 38 36 0.013
9 10 0.029 24 27 0.023 39 41 0.013
10 2 0.029 25 19 0.023 40 44 0.012
11 6 0.028 26 30 0.023 41 39 0.012
12 23 0.027 27 18 0.022 42 45 0.012
13 13 0.026 28 31 0.02 43 43 0.012
14 22 0.026 29 28 0.02 44 38 0.011
15 1 0.026 30 29 0.02 45 37 0.01
Tab. 2.1: Popularity of the 45 numbers in a 6/45 powerball game.
100s to 400s, then slowly to the 900s. A similar phenomenon was also ob-
served by Cherno (1999) in his study of the 4-digit game in Massachusetts.
The sales data received on a particular draw in Pennsylvania was clearly
presented in Halpern and Devereaux (1989), which allows us to quantify this
phenomenon in the numbers games. Figure 2.1 shows the empirical distribu-
tion of the sum-of-three-digits statistics of the numbers chosen by the players
in the Pennsylvania game. We compare the empirical distribution against
the base case where all the 3-digit numbers are selected with equal probabil-
ity (i.e., the uniform-choice model). Interestingly, the empirical distribution
indicates a leftward shift from the base-case distribution, indicating a general
preference for smaller digits in the number selections.
This empirical evidence indeed suggests that players favor small num-
bers. We call this the small-number phenomenon in the numbers game.
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Fig. 2.1: Distribution of the sum-of-three-digits statistics in the 3-digit numbers
game.
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2.2.2 Explanations
Studies investigating cognitions of lottery ticket purchasers showed that peo-
ple failed to recognize that each number on a ticket is independent of the
others. For example, Ladouceur et al. (1996) showed that adults were more
likely to select the "most random" perceived combinations, although in real-
ity each ticket was as likely to win as the others. In addition, Langer (1975)
asserted that factors in a chance situation which are typically associated
with skill situations (such as choice, competition, and passive or active in-
volvement) cause an individual to believe they have control over a situation
that is completely governed by chance. Ladouceur et al. (1996) found that
individuals who selected their own lottery ticket requested a larger sum of
money in order to relinquish or sell back their ticket than those individu-
als who were randomly given a ticket (machine generated numbers). They
concluded that participants who were able to select their own lottery ticket
perceived their ticket as having a greater chance of winning and, as a result,
assigned a higher monetary value to the ticket than individuals in the no-
choice condition. Erroneous beliefs commonly held by adult gamblers were
also identied in Hardoon et al. (1997) and Ladouceur and Walker (1996).
Herman et al. (1998) studied the question as to when children's gambling
behavior resembles that of adults. They showed that as children get older
they are more specic in their beliefs that certain types of tickets are more
likely to win than others.
There are a few explanations for the small-number phenomenon in lot-
tery games. As stated in many studies (e.g., Halpern and Devereaux (1989),
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Simon (1999), etc.), a large proportion of players tend to select numbers
associated with special dates (e.g., birthdays, anniversaries, etc.), meaning-
ful numbers (e.g., phone numbers, car numbers, address numbers, etc.), and
special events (e.g., accidents and murders), and these numbers tend to start
with smaller digits (e.g., there are only 12 months in a year, so that the
numbers 1-12 should be more popular than the numbers 13-45 in many 6/45
lotto games). Another explanation put forth by researchers is the observa-
tion that human beings simply can not choose numbers in a uniform manner.
Loetscher and Brugger (2007) demonstrated using experimental methods
that there is indeed a cognitive bias towards the selection of small numbers
by human beings, even when they are told to select numbers \randomly." In
one of their studies, a total of 488 subjects were told to \name a sequence of
digits with each digit chosen from 1 to 6 as randomly as possible," and they
found a surplus of small digits (1, 2, or 3) in all their experiments.
These studies, unfortunately, oer only anecdotal evidence (through sur-
veys and interviews) and rudimentary explanations for the existence of the
small-number phenomenon, and do not provide an analytical framework to
quantify and model this phenomenon.
Another factor inuencing the choice of numbers is superstitious beliefs,
widely held by players of lottery games. In Chinese culture, certain numbers
are believed by some to be lucky (or unlucky) based on the similarity of their
pronunciation to that of certain Chinese words. For instance, Chinese people
usually associate the digit 8 with prosperity, and thus numbers containing
the digit 8 are normally more popular2. On the other hand, the number 4
2 In fact, China Mobile's Jiangxi branch held an auction to sell a \lucky" phone number
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is considered unlucky in many cultures in Asia, since it sounds like the word
for \death" in spoken Chinese. Such beliefs concerning lucky and unlucky
numbers tend to aect the popularity of certain numbers in the lottery game,
leading to uneven distribution of the wagers on the dierent numbers.
2.2.3 Modeling Empirical Data
There have been several attempts to model the biases in the choice model of
players. Simon (1999) considered the impact of the \lucky-number" biases
and developed a model to approximate the distribution of the number of
times that a combination would be chosen in the UK national lottery game.
This provided a more accurate choice model for the UK lottery game, and
tted the data better than the uniform-choice model. Stern and Cover (1989)
obtained the choice probability for each number in a lotto game, from the
empirical marginal frequencies, by solving a related entropy-minimization
problem. Ziemba et al. (1986) used regression methods and empirical data to
estimate the popularity of each number combination in the lotto game. Haigh
(1997) used choice probabilities directly on a set of numbers to estimate the
popularity of the number combinations. Unfortunately, all these methods
took the empirical data as given and focused merely on nding a better
choice model to t the empirical data. Thus, these methods did not exploit
the existence of the small-number phenomenon in their modeling approaches,
nor did they try to quantify this phenomenon.
recently, and one such number - with six consecutive eights - was sold for RMB 44,000!
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2.2.4 Contributions
In this topic, we investigate the small-number phenomenon in the numbers
games (rather than the lotto games) and use it to address the liability limits
management problem. Our contributions in this topic are as follows:
 We quantify the small-number phenomenon through a curious fact ob-
served by Newcomb (1881) and independently by Benford (1938). In-
terestingly, while the classical Benford's law captures the proportion of
bets on the rst signicant digit reasonably well, it fails to account for
the self-replicating nature of the empirical data beyond the rst signif-
icant digit. By carefully modeling the ways players compose the digits
in the numbers game, we rene Benford's law to develop an alternate
consumer-choice model for dierent bet types using a handful of pa-
rameters only. Surprisingly, this parsimonious choice model is already
able to capture some of the most important characteristics of the data
in the numbers game.
 We examine the consequences of the small-number phenomenon on the
prize liability performance of the game operator. In particular, our
analysis suggests that it will be fruitful for the operators to pursue
strategies to reduce the eect of the small-number phenomenon; that
is, to promote or encourage players to choose numbers randomly. On
the other hand, we show that the debate on whether a sales limit should
be imposed on the game can be examined from the demand side - if
numbers are selected in a uniform manner, then it may be futile to
impose any sales limit since the performance is very sensitive to the
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total sales revenues of the game; that is, with a slight change in total
sales revenues, the operator may swing from a situation with all num-
bers hitting the sales limit to a situation where all bets are accepted.
Unless the total sales revenue can be accurately forecasted, it will be
dicult to set the right sales limit in this environment. The small-
number phenomenon in the choice process actually helps to stabilize
this relationship between the total sales revenues and the proportion of
numbers sold out. The imposition of a sales limit is thus more eective
in such environment.
2.3 Modeling the Small-Number Phenomenon
Classical economic theory assumes that players behave like rational agents,
and make decisions based on utility-maximization reasoning. As the returns
from each number combination are identical, these players have no specic
preference for any particular number and thus all numbers are selected with
equal probability. We call these \Type 1" players.
However, recent empirical studies show that agents are not always seek-
ing utility maximization in their decision making since framing, loss aver-
sion, decision biases etc. can have major eects on players' decisions. To
understand the small-number phenomenon, we need to augment the classi-
cal approach by incorporating the behavior of agents who pick their \lucky"
numbers (arising from events in their daily life, or through superstitious
beliefs) using reasoning which cannot be captured by any economic model.
These players are superstitious, and have a general tendency to avoid betting
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on certain digits.3. We call these the \Type 2" players.
We also assume that each player bets $1 on each number chosen.
Denition 1. Let B and N denote the proportions of type 2 and type 1
players respectively, with
B + N = 1: (2.1)
The challenge in our problem is to estimate the proportions of type 1 and
type 2 agents in the population of players based on the aggregate sales data.
To this end, we need to have a better understanding on how type 2 agents
choose their numbers. As these \lucky" numbers are normally selected from
data series arising in the daily life of these type 2 agents, we will exploit a
curious property associated with these natural numbers.
2.3.1 Benford's law
Newcomb (1881) observed that the rst few pages of books of logarithms
were more worn than the last few and inferred that there might be more num-
bers starting with 1 or 2 than starting with larger numbers. Newcomb then
drew a counter-intuitive conclusion that the rst signicant digits (i.e., rst
non-zero digits) of many data series in nature are not evenly distributed as
expected, but follow a logarithmic law. Almost 50 years later, independently
of Newcomb, Benford (1938) noticed the same phenomenon for categories
of naturally occurring numerical data; for example, areas of rivers, atomic
weights, numbers from Reader's Digest, and so on. He then came to the same
3 Interestingly, our data suggests that players in Pennsylvania have an aversion to the
digit 2, but favor digits 7 and 8.
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conclusion, now known as Benford's law, which Newcomb had arrived at so
many years previously. Both Newcomb (1881) and Benford (1938) proposed
that the probability that a number has the rst signicant digit D1 in a set
[1::9], is given by






; for all d1 2 [1::9]: (2.2)
LetDi denote the i
th signicant digit of a number. Hill (1995a) extended
the above observation to a general version of Benford's law: for all d1 2 [1::9],
and dk 2 [0::9] for k > 1,




j=1 dj  10i j

: (2.3)
Empirical evidence of Benford's law has appeared in a wide range of data;
for example, stock index (Ley (1996)), income tax (Nigrini (1996)), math-
ematical series (Whitney (1972)), and so on. Benford (1938) analyzed the
underlying causes of this logarithmic phenomenon using a heuristic argument.
Other mathematicians and statisticians have oered various explanations for
this phenomenon. Raimi (1976) gave a review of some of the more intuitive
explanations. It wasn't until 1995 that Hill (1995a) provided a formal rig-
orous proof that Benford's law is the only probability distribution which is
scale-invariant and base-invariant. Using modern mathematical probability
theory, and the scale- and base-invariant proofs, Hill rigorously demonstrated
that the \distribution of distributions" given by random samples taken from
a wide variety of dierent distributions in fact satises Benford's law (cf. Hill
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(1998)).
One of the main applications of Benford's law is in fraud detection,
under the hypothesis that fabricating data which conform to Benford's law
is dicult. Recent empirical evidence shows that true accounting data sets
conform very closely to Benford's law (Thomas (1989), Nigrini (1996)). On
the other hand, fabricated data rarely conform to Benford's law. Therefore,
digital analysis based on Benford's law has been proposed as a new tool
for fraud detection in recent years. Another application of Benford's law
has been in the design of computers. Peter Schatte (1988) devised rules
that optimize computer data storage, by allocating disk space according to
the proportions dictated by Benford's law, based on the assumption that
input request satisfy Benford's law. Furthermore, both Varian (1972) and
Hill (1995b) suggested using Benford's law as a test of the reasonableness of
forecasts of a proposed model. If real life data follows Benford's law, it seems
reasonable to assume that a good mathematical model should also do so.
In this topic, we add to this growing list of applications by showing that
Benford's law can be used to capture the number selection behavior of type
2 agents in our model.
2.3.2 Choice Model for Type 2 Agents
WLOG, we will develop the choice model based on a 3D game, using the
sales data published earlier in Halpern and Devereaux (1989). We have cross
validated this model on other empirical data in several other number games,
but unfortunately, due to the sensitivity of the data, we could not report
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the results here. For ease of exposition, we ignore the bets received for the
number 000 from subsequent analysis; that is, we assume that none of the
players will place a bet on the number 000. Using this assumption, the
betting proles of the type 1 players are drawn from a uniform distribution
where all the numbers from 001 to 999 will have an equal chance of being
selected. We focus next on the betting behavior of the type 2 players.
To ensure that the number selected has exactly 3 digits, we assume that
the type 2 player may choose to compose a 3-digit number by padding the
number he or she has chosen with leading zeros.4
Denition 2. Let i denote the proportion of type 2 players who are betting




i = 1: (2.4)
We rst state a very simple consumer-choice model, where the classical
Benford's law holds directly for the 3-digit numbers played.
Assumption 1. We assume that the type 2 player will choose to play the
3-digit number d1 : : : di (d1 > 0), with 3  i leading zeros, with probability
i log10(1 +
1
d1  10i 1 + :::+ di ): (2.5)
4 Note that this simplifying assumption may not hold in general, as some players may
pad the numbers with trailing zeros, and some may simply duplicate the numbers to reach
a 3-digit number. Halpern and Devereaux (1989) mentioned that triplets like 111 or 888
are very popular in the Pick-3 game in Pennsylvania. Unfortunately, it does not appear
possible to incorporate such features into the model, without sacricing the simplicity and
tractability of the calibration model.
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Note that this is none other than the classical Benford's law, except that
we weigh it with a factor i to account for the proportion of players who bet
with i signicant digits.
It is now easy to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, the expected proportion of the betting
volume on a 3-digit number with rst signicant digit i, denoted by E[S(i)],
is






+ N  1
9
; for all i = 1; 2; : : : 9: (2.6)
Note that E[S(i)] does not depend on j. We can thus use this property
to calibrate the value of B and N , by looking at the proportion of bets
received for each signicant digit. In the 3D data from Pennsylvania, the
proportion of the type 2 and type 1 players are estimated to be 39.58%
(B = 0:3958) and 60.42% (N = 0:6042), according to the least square
model. We plot next the expected proportion of the rst signicant digit,
given by the optimal parameter values, as shown in Figure 2.2, along with
the empirical proportion. The prediction from Benford's law captures the
general trend in the empirical data, although we observe a general preference
for rst signicant digit 3, 7 and 8 among the players, whereas the digit 2 has
lower frequency than expected. Although we can rene our model to build in
these biases into the model, we opted not to do so because such preferences
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do not appear to be universal across cultures.




















Fig. 2.2: Fitted proportion by the model.
While the simple model in Assumption 1 captures the behavior concern-
ing the rst signicant digit rather accurately, we examine its ability to track
the proportion of betting volume for the rst two signicant digits. We plot
next the expected proportion of bets received and the empirical averages in
Figure 2.3. Interestingly, our model is able to capture the declining popular-
ity in the 3-digit numbers, as the rst two signicant digits grow from 10 to
99. This provides a partial explanation for the small-number phenomenon
often observed in the games. Unfortunately, it could not explain the fact
that the small-number phenomenon exists even in each decile (sub-block), as
shown in Figure 2.3.
To understand the choice preferences beyond the rst signicant digit,
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Fig. 2.3: Fitted proportion by the model for the rst two signicant digits.
we need to model an important characteristic in the way players compose
the 3-digit numbers in the game. One such common strategy is to combine
data from two dierent series to form a 3-digit number. For example, the
number 246 could come from the 24th day of the month of June, or it could
come from the address being level 6 of block unit number 24. The previous
model assumes that the 3-digit numbers come from a single data series and
hence fails to capture this switching behavior.
We notice that the probability distribution in our rst assumption can
be written in a dierent form:
i log10(1 +
1
d1  10i 1 + :::+ di )
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Here, i represents the probability that the type 2 player will pick a number
with i signicant digits. log10(1 +
1
d110i 1+:::+di )= log10(1 +
1
d110i 2+:::+di 1 )
represents the probability that the ith digit is di, given that the rst i   1
digits are d1 : : : di 1. To model the switching behavior, we rene the recursive
approach in the following way:








d110i 2+:::+di 1 ) + 
denote the probability that the player will continue to generate the ith
digit di as if it comes from the same data series as the rst i  1 digits,
with parameter  > 0. Note that in this way, the players will switch to




d110i 2+:::+di 1 ) + 
:
 If the players switch to a dierent data series, let p0 denote the proba-
bility that they will switch to the digit \0." Otherwise, they will switch
to digit i, with i 2 f1; : : : ; 9g, with probability (1  p0) log10(1 + 1i ).






1  p0 ; and  :=
q
1  q :
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We can now model the switching behavior in the 3-digit game in the following
way:
Assumption 2. We assume that the type 2 player will choose to play the





(1  q) log10(1 + 1d110+d2 ) + q(1  p0) log10(1 + 1d2 )
(1  q) log10(1 + 1d1 ) + q
   
(1  q) log10(1 +
1
d110i 1+:::+di ) + q(1  p0) log10(1 + 1di )
(1  q) log10(1 + 1d110i 2+:::+di 1 ) + q
:
In this way, we can interpret the parameters as follows.
Denition 3. Let q denote the switching probability. Let p0 denote the prob-
ability that the digit will be switched to 0.
Let E[S(i; j)] denote the expected proportion of bets with rst two signicant
digits i and j respectively.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption (2),






+ N  1
9
; for all i = 1; 2; : : : 9;





(1  q) log10(1 + 1i10+j ) + q(1  p0) log10(1 + 1j )








Note that the expected proportion of rst signicant digits remains un-
changed under both assumptions. The parameters under Assumption 2 are
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calibrated to be q = 0:9105; p0 = 0:1054, to best t the empirical data under
the least square model.
We compare the expected frequencies of rst two signicant digits with
those in empirical data respectively in Figure 2.4. The frequencies generated











First two significant digits
Empirical data
Fitted proportion
Fig. 2.4: Fitted proportion for the rst two signicant digits.
from this model closely t the frequencies of the empirical data. More inter-
estingly, this model is able to capture the small-number phenomenon in the
second signicant digit of the data series.
Note that so far the parameters j did not feature in the analysis. This
arises because we have xed the number of signicant digits. To complete
our specication of the choice model, we need to estimate the values of these
parameters. Let ^j denote the sample average of the proportion of bets with
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exactly 3  j leading zeros. We use ^j to obtain an unbiased estimator of j,




= ^j; for j  1: (2.7)
2.3.3 Model Validation
We show next that the choice model under Assumption 2 proposed in the
earlier section has the ability to track some of the most important character-
istics of the betting data in the 3D game.
We rst estimate the behavior for the sum-of-digits statistic, using data sim-
ulated according to Assumption 1 (with the calibrated parameters). We
compare it with the empirical data (after removing the betting volumes on
the 3-digit number 000). Figure 2.5 depicts the distributions of the sum-of-
digits in three data series: the actual data, simulated data from our choice
model, and the uniform-choice model.
The estimation of 39.58% type 2 and 60.42% type 1 players in the pop-
ulation seems right, as it captures the magnitude of the leftward shift in the
empirical data reasonably well. Also, note that our choice model does not
account for the superstitious beliefs observed in the empirical data (players
generally avoid 2 and prefer 7 and 8). This partially explains why the pro-
portions from our model are higher for smaller sum-of-digits (from 3 to 7)
and lower for sum-of-digits around 15.
We track the performance of another statistic - the numbers of 3-digit
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Fig. 2.5: Distributions of sum-of-digits in empirical data, simulated data with As-
sumption 2, and uniform choice
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bets attaining a certain betting volume. Figure 2.6 shows the number of
3-digit numbers in the game with a given betting volume (specied in the
horizontal axis). The distribution obtained from the uniform-choice model
follows a binomial distribution, and centers mainly around the mean. This
yields a poor t for the empirical data. The distribution obtained from our
choice model clearly has a better t.


























Fig. 2.6: Betting volume of actual data, simulated data with Assumption 2, and
uniform choice.
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2.4 Applications
The small-number phenomenon clearly has important implications for the
operational risk management of the game. The numbers picked by the type
2 players introduce variability and skewness to the distribution of bets on
the 3-digit numbers. The winning numbers, on the other hand, are randomly
(i.e., uniformly) rolled out by a mechanical device, which implies that the
hot numbers are chosen with the same probability as other numbers. The
mismatch between the winning number distribution and the betting volume
distribution leads to a signicant operational risk: the operators may face a
substantial payout if a popular number happens to be picked as the winning
number! This is a phenomenon which often worried the game operators. In
Quebec, according to Lafaille and Simonis (2005), \the rst drawing caused
a prize liability well in excess of the amount received in sales." Fortunately,
\over the long run it all evened out and the projected prize percentage was
achieved."
We show in this section that the small-number phenomenon plays a
signicant role in the large volatility of prize liability experienced by many
operators in the game. We further exploit this observation to propose a
method to help determine the sales limit in these games.
2.4.1 Volatility of prize liability
We examine the impact on the prize payout volatility by the proportion of
type 2 players in the population of players. We compare the variability of
payout in the 3D game, as we increase the proportion of type 2 players from
2. Topic 1: Small Number Phenomenon 32
0% to 39.58% in the choice model (both with Assumption 1 and Assumption
2). For this study, we assume that the sales limit is higher than demands, so
that all bets are accepted.
Consider a game with a prize P and N players, each betting $1 on a
number drawn from a respective distribution. Let XB(n) denote the amount
of bets received on the number n when the proportion of type 2 players is
equal to B. When the winning number for that prize is drawn uniformly
among the 999 numbers (from 001 to 999, as we have ruled out the bets on
































If all theN players choose their numbers independently,XB(n)  Bi(N; pB(n)),
where pB(n) denote the probability that number n is picked in our choice
model, given that the proportion of type 2 players is B. Hence,
E(XB(n)
2) = N2p2B(n) +NpB(n)(1  pB(n)):
2. Topic 1: Small Number Phenomenon 33
























































Fig. 2.7: Variance of payout as the proportion of type 2 players increases.
We can thus analytically compare the variance of the payout, under
dierent values of B. As shown in Figure 2.7, under both assumptions,
the variability of payout is increasing as the proportion of type 2 players
increases. When B is equal to 0, that is, the demand is evenly distributed,
the variance of payout is only 0:0031012. When B increases to 39:58%, the
variance of payout under Assumption 1 is 3:6794  1012, about 1216 times
higher than that of the uniform-choice model. Since Assumption 2 captures
more of the volatility of the data, the variance of payout is 13:049 1012 in
this model, 4313 times bigger than that of the uniform-choice model.
Note that our choice model only includes 39.58% type 2 players and does
not account for other random eects such as date or month eect. So, the
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volatility of actual prize payout should be even worse. For the 3D game in
Pennsylvania, we conclude that the standard deviation of the prize payout
can be reduced by 65 times if the proportion of the type 2 agents (B) reduces
to 0.
2.4.2 Liability Limit
In the rest of this section, we use the small-number phenomenon to set the
appropriate liability limit for the 3D game. Let Dn denote the (random)
demand of a 3-digit number n. The distribution of Dn depends on the
proportion of type 1 and type 2 players in the game. Let C denote the
corresponding sales limit. Let Sn denote the accepted sales for number n;
i.e.,
Sn = min(Dn; C):
Note that
E[Sn] = C  P (Dn > C) + E(DnjDn  C)  P (Dn  C):
Let R(S1; : : : ; SN) denote the \risk exposure" when sales for the N num-
bers are given by (S1; : : : ; SN). There are several ways to model the risk
measure R(), and it generally depends on the distribution of the winning
numbers drawn.
Suppose the expected return given $1 bet is r. We use the mean-risk
trade-o to model the utility function of the game operator. The expected
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R(S1; : : : ; SN)
	
;
where  is an exogenous penalty term for risk exposure.






[CP (Dn > C)+E(DnjDn  C)P (Dn  C)] E

R(min(D1; C); : : : ;min(DN ; C))
	
:
It can be easily shown that the objective function is convex. Thus,
according to the rst order condition, the optimal liability limit C satises:
NX
n=1









Note that the left hand side corresponds to the expected number of hot
numbers, i.e., the expected number of bet types reaching the sales limit in
the draw. The sales limit can be set by merely choosing a sales limit C to
control the number of hot numbers.
Suppose the total bets collected are to the value of $N , and the cut-o
limit is $C for each number. We next estimate the expected number of hot
numbers (i.e., the numbers with betting volumes hitting the liability limit).
We dene an indicator function YB(n) as follows:
YB(n) =
8><>: 1 if XB(n)  C;0 otherwise.
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Note we can use a normal distribution N(NpB(n);
p
NpB(n)(1  pB(n)))


















We can thus analytically compute the expected number of hot numbers
given a liability limit $C, and compare the results using dierent liability
limits. Figure 2.8 shows the expected number of hot numbers under dierent
liability limits in the case that 39.58% players are type 2 and 60.42% players
are type 1, and in the ideal case that all players are type 1 agents.
In the ideal case, because all numbers are selected with equal probability,
the concentration of measure phenomenon kicks in and the expected number
of hot numbers goes through a phase transition - dropping sharply from 999
(all sold out) to 0 (none sold out) for a narrow range of sales limit. This
is most evident from Figure 2.8: when the total sales is $9M, $10M, $11M,
and $12M respectively, the expected number of hot numbers drops sharply
to zero when the liability limit is around $10000, $11000, $12000, and $13000
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Fig. 2.8: Expected number of hot numbers using dierent liabilities.
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respectively. In this environment, trying to nd the appropriate sales limit
to control the right level of hot numbers is almost impossible because this
number depends critically on the total sales level, a number which normally
uctuates from draw to draw.
In the empirical sales data, we have B  0:3958. In this environment,
interestingly, the phase transition phenomenon disappears, and the relation-
ship between the sales limit and the expected number of hot numbers is
more stable. For a sales limit of $1000, the hot numbers uctuate from 200
to 400 when the total sales level changes from $9M to $12M. The relationship
between the total sales and proportion of hot numbers are thus more stable.
2.5 Conclusion
In this topic, we have analyzed an interesting phenomenon in a popular
numbers game. While it is by now folklore that players in these games prefer
small numbers, this paper is arguably the rst to quantify this behavior
using Benford's law. The connection is forged by virtue of the argument that
many natural data series satisfy Benford's law. We also take into account the
choice behavior of the players, in particular the way the players compose the
3-digit number to obtain a rened choice model. Although we do not model
additional phenomenon such as superstitious beliefs and date-month eect on
the choice behavior, the simple model we built, using only a few parameters
(i.e., the proportion of type 2 agents B, the probability of switching q, and
the probability of padding the number with digit zero p0), is already able to
capture some of the most important characteristics of the empirical data.
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While we have presented only the analysis using a set of publicly avail-
able data from the US, we have tested the model on an extensive series of
data provided by a game operator in another region. Despite the dier-
ences in culture and beliefs, we found that the same underlying model can
be used to describe the behavior of the aggregate data, with the main dier-
ence coming from the proportion of Benford-like players. We believe that the
small-number phenomenon is a generic behavior inherent in many numbers
games.
The proportion of type 2 players (N) has a tremendous impact on the
variability of the prize liability, and to a certain extent aects the appropriate
choice of sales limit in the numbers game. There are many ways to mitigate
the small-number eect through demand shaping. One approach, already in
use, is to use on-site computer terminals to help players to pick the numbers
randomly. However, people often do not like random picks because they like
to assume some control over the outcomes (cf. Langer (1975)). Therefore,
there may be limits on the extent to which the industry can encourage ran-
dom picks. Another approach is to re-design the game to encourage the play-
ers to bet on as many dierent permutations as possible. In Singapore, the
introduction of a new iBet system (cf. http://www.singaporepools.com.sg)
proves to be popular with the players. The new system allows the players to
spread a dollar bet on as many permutations of the number combination as
possible, with a corresponding reduction in the prize monies. It also helps
to mitigate the eect of the small number phenomenon. Other possible ap-
proaches include posting the results of past winning numbers in the retail
outlets to inuence the selection of numbers by the players. The past win-
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ning numbers are drawn in a random manner and thus will not exhibit the
same feature as numbers picked by Benford's type player. Of course, recency
bias may actually deters players from betting on recent winning numbers,
and hence this approach may not be as eective in persuading players from
moving away from their preferred numbers.
Interestingly, if the game operators are able to reduce the proportion
of benford players, then the above analysis shows that the imposition of the
sales limit may no longer be needed, since it will be dicult and futile to
implement such a mechanism anyway.
3. TOPIC 2: APPOINTMENT SYSTEM DESIGN USING
COPOSITIVE CONES
3.1 Abstract
In this topic, we investigate a stochastic appointment scheduling problem in
an outpatient clinic with a single doctor. The number of patients and their
sequence of arrivals are xed, and the scheduling problem is to determine an
appointment time for each customer. The service durations of the patients
are stochastic, and only the mean and covariance estimates are known. We
do not assume any exact distributional form of the service durations, and
solve for distributionally robust schedules that minimize the expectation of
the weighted sum of patients' waiting time and doctor's overtime. We for-
mulate this scheduling problem as a convex conic optimization problem with
a tractable semidenite relaxation. Our model can be extended to handle
additional support constraints of the service durations. Using the primal-
dual optimality conditions, we prove several interesting structural properties
of optimal schedules. Despite the required relaxation in computation, we
can still obtain near optimal solutions compared to the existing literature.
We apply our method in a realistic setting at an eye clinic and suggest new
3. Topic 2: Appointment System Design using Copositive Cones 42
schedules that can signicantly improve the eciency of the clinic.
3.2 Introduction
In many service delivery systems, the core operational activities are largely
planned around the arrival times of the customers. The ability to regulate
the arrival of customers through a suitable appointment system, is thus cen-
tral to the performance of these systems. The FastPass service of Disney is a
well known example. Customers in the park can obtain a pass to ensure fast
service at certain rides if they return at the stipulated time. The temple of
Tirumala in India has also used an online appointment system to convert its
long waiting line into a virtual queue. This has helped improve service de-
livery and generated spillover economic benets to businesses in the vicinity
of the temple1.
The appointment design problem is also a core problem for healthcare
facilities such as outpatient clinics and operating rooms. The appointment
system is used to regulate the usage of the costly equipment and precious
resources in the system. In an eye-care facility that we have visited, there are
two consultation sessions per day, each lasting four hours, and the number
of doctors available per session is around two to seven. Each doctor has
to handle 20 to 30 patients per session. The patients can be classied into
\New" (20%) and \Repeat" (80%) patient types. The mean and variance of
the consultation times of the new patients are noticeably higher than those of
repeat patients, as the conditions of the new patients are hitherto unknown
1 See http://www.iimahd.ernet.in/publications/data/2005-08-02nravi.pdf for a thor-
ough discussion.
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prior to the visit. There are also various operational details that complicate
the situation. For instance, patients often have to go for a dilation test
prior to seeing the doctor. This process adds to the complexity of nding an
optimal appointment strategy for the system.
One key performance indicator in this system is the \Turnaround Time"
(TAT), dened to be the time from the moment the patient walks into the
clinic, to the moment the patient leaves the clinic. Figure 3.1 shows the
overall median TAT, service time and waiting time (WT) of patients arriving
in dierent time slots for two dierent sessions in the clinic, where TAT is
the sum of service and waiting times. Clearly the patients are experiencing
long turn around time, with waiting time far exceeding the actual service
time.
Fig. 3.1: Median time from registration to payment
We note that there are several pertinent features in this system: (i)
New patients often have to undergo a series of checks (such as visual acuity,
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and/or other advanced tests) after the consultation, some of which can take
as much as 2.5 hours. To make sure that all the tests and consultations can
be performed within the same day, the doctors prefer to see the new patients
in the early portion of the morning session. Consequently, early morning
slots are reserved primarily for new patients. (ii) The current appointment
strategy is to allocate 5 minutes per patient slot for one hour, followed by a
half hour break. This allows each doctor to see around 36 patients in each
4-hour session.
This leads to the central questions for this topic: is there any (near)
optimal strategy to schedule and sequence the arrival of patients such that the
waiting time of the patients and overtime work of the doctor are minimized?
Furthermore, are there any \distributionally robust" solutions that perform
well for a wide range of service time distributions?
The research on appointment system design over the past few decades
has been driven largely by these issues. However, these problems are noto-
riously dicult. Standard queueing theory does not apply as we are inter-
ested in the transient performance measures of the system. It is technically
challenging to calculate the expected waiting time of the nth patient in the
sequence, due to the diculty of propagating the impact of earlier events on
this patient. Recently, Begen and Queyranne (2009) show that the schedul-
ing problem is solvable in polynomial time (in the size of the representation
of the discrete distributions). However, this method works well only for dis-
crete distributions with a small number of distinct values. To the best of
our knowledge, simulation and stochastic programming methods are still the
preferred approaches for the appointment design problem. Unfortunately,
3. Topic 2: Appointment System Design using Copositive Cones 45
the solutions obtained are often sensitive to the samples used to develop the
schedules, and hence very little is known about the structure of the optimal
policies, even in the simplest environment with one doctor and when patients
arrive punctually according to the appointment time.
3.2.1 Contributions
In this topic, we develop a convex conic programming approach to solve
the appointment scheduling problem. We show that this problem can be
suitably reformulated as a two-stage stochastic optimization problem. In
the second stage, we construct a network ow model to capture the waiting
time of each patient, under a given scheduling policy (from the rst stage
problem). Our novelty comes in the solution to the rst stage problem, which
is a technically challenging problem. Instead of using a specic service time
distribution to design the schedule, we employ a minimax approach so that
the schedule is designed to minimize the maximum expected cost achieved
by some distribution from a family of distributions. Next, we develop a conic
optimization framework to transform the stochastic appointment scheduling
problem into a single deterministic copositive programming problem (COP)2.
Using the primal-dual optimality conditions, we prove several interest-
ing structural properties of the optimal schedule. For instance, our analysis
shows that when the appointment system is operating under the optimal
schedule, other than the rst slot and the last few ones (where the consul-
tation intervals allocated are zero, i.e., patients are bunched together), the
2 A copositive programming problem is a linear programming problem over the convex
cone of the copositive matrices. Details of this optimization problem are discussed later
in this topic.
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chances of waiting for service in the clinic is identical for patients assigned
to all other slots. Furthermore, our model can also handle the correlations
between patients' service durations, which has been largely overlooked in
literature.
Computationally, we solve a tractable semidenite approximation to the
COP. Although the schedule obtained using our model is optimal for a set of
canonical service time distributions (called worst case distributions), our nu-
merical results show that this schedule also works reasonably well for several
other service duration distributions with the same moment conditions. We
also nd that the schedule obtained from solving the SDP approximation of-
ten satises the structural properties obtained from model analysis. Further-
more, with the help of existing semidenite programming (SDP) packages,
we can work out practical size appointment scheduling problems.
In a congested system with two types of patients, as in our eye clinic case,
the optimal schedule often exhibits the pattern: \Bailey's Rule + Break"3 -
the optimal schedule allocates near zero time slot to the rst few patients,
which resembles the well known \Bailey's Rule", and a break is often inserted
before switching from a class of patients with higher variability to another
class of patients with lower variability. We use this observation and the
solution from the SDP model to develop a simple and practical schedule for
the eye clinic. Compared to the naive approach of allocating equal interval to
3 \Bailey's Rule" refers to the scheduling strategy proposed in the seminal paper by
Bailey (1952). It states that in a highly congested system, \an optimum system seems to
be as follows: the patients are given appointments at regular intervals equal to the average
consultation time, and the consultant arrives at the same time as the second patient". That
means the rst two patients are scheduled to come at the beginning of the consultation
session at the same time.
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each patient with a break in between (which is current practice in the clinic),
our schedule can reduce the total system waiting cost by more than 35%.
This approach has thus the potential of producing near optimal appointment
schedules that can be deployed in practice.
Finally, we extend this approach to incorporate sequencing decision into
the appointment design problem. We show that the problem can be solved
approximately as a 0-1 SDP problem. Our numerical results give several
insights into the structure of the optimal sequencing decisions. In particular,
we observe that the optimal sequence may not follow the smallest variance
rst rule. In fact, in some instances, a U-shape rule is more ecient. This is
surprising as it is counter-intuitive to put a high variability patient in front
of the queue to minimize the total expected waiting time.
3.2.2 Structure of the Topic
In the next section, we briey review the relevant literature for our prob-
lem. In Section 3.4, we describe the development of our conic optimization
model in two steps, followed by several important extensions in Section 3.5
to address more practical issues. In Section 3.6, we analyze the structure and
properties of the optimal scheduling policy, while in Section 3.7, numerical
studies are presented to evaluate our approach under various circumstances
as well as a case study of the eye clinic. We conclude in Section 3.9.
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3.3 Literature Review
Since the pioneering work of Bailey (1952) and Welch & Bailey (1952), there
have been extensive studies on the appointment design problem in the past
six decades. In this section, we only briey review some key results from
this line of research that is most relevant to our topic, but refer the readers
to Cayirli and Veral (2003), Gupta (2007), Gupta and Denton (2008) and
Erdogan & Denton (2010) for more thorough reviews.
Denton & Gupta (2003) formulate the appointment scheduling problem
as a two-stage stochastic linear program and used a sequential bounding
approach to determine upper bounds of the problem. Kaandorp & Koole
(2007) assume that the service durations follow an exponential distribution
and that the patient arrivals can only be scheduled at discrete intervals.
They used results in queueing theory to calculate the objective function for a
given schedule of starting times and used a local search algorithm to nd the
optimal solution. Begen and Queyranne (2009) go a step further and argue
that under mild assumptions, the discrete time version of the appointment
scheduling problem could be solved in polynomial time, by showing that
the objective function is an L-convex function. A recent paper by Begen et
al. (2010) is based on the methodology developed in Begen and Queyranne
(2009) but assume no prior knowledge of probability distributions on job
durations. They re-constructe an empirical distribution of the consultation
durations from a set of historical data and then developed a sampling-based
approach and established the cost (numbers of samples needed) to obtain a
near-optimal solution with high probability.
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When patients are homogenous, the issues are simpler since scheduling
rules are now the only concern. In practice, however, patients are distinct
due to patient's classication (e.g., new/repeat, ages, types of procedures
performed etc.). Patients in dierent classications tend to give rise to dif-
ferent means and variability in consultation/service time durations. Higher
percentage of more complicated cases (e.g., new patients) normally translates
into higher variability in the system performance, and thus proper sequencing
of patients become more valuable (cf. Vanden and Dietz (2000) and Cayirli et
al. (2008)). Weiss (1990) is arguably the rst to study the optimal sequencing
problem analytically. He explored the optimal starting time and sequencing
of surgical procedures, to best utilize medical resources like surgeons and op-
erating rooms. He showed that sequencing lower-variance procedure rst is
optimal in the case of 2 procedures under exponential/uniform service time.
Weiss also conjectured that the smaller-variance-rst rule might be optimal in
more complicated systems. Similar results were later reported for local-scale
distributions like normal and uniform distributions (cf. Gupta (2007)).
In view of the analytical and computational diculties of the appoint-
ment scheduling problem, we address the issue from a dierent angle, utilizing
the concept of robust optimization. Evolving from the minimax theorem es-
tablished by John Von Neuman in 1928, the concept was rst brought into
operations research area by Scarf (1958). Scarf solves an inventory problem
with random demand by assuming only the mean and variance of the demand
instead of a specic form of distribution. Noting that there could be mul-
tiple distributions that satisfy a given mean and variance, Scarf identies a
worst case distribution that would result in the highest expected total system
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cost, and nds an inventory strategy to minimize this maximal cost. That
is why another popular term describing this concept is called distributionally
robust. Such a concept has recently been extensively studied and extended,
and one stream of research is to exploit the connection between the theory of
moments and semidenite programming (SDP) (cf. Bertsimas et al. (2004),
Bertsimas et al. (2006), Bertsimas et al. (2008), Vandenberge et al. (2007),
etc.). Most recently, Natarajan et al. (2009) show that a robust mixed 0-1
linear program under objective uncertainty is equivalent to a convex conic
program, which may help to deal with a second stage recourse function in a
two stage stochastic programming framework.
3.4 A Two Stage Model with the Copositive Cone
3.4.1 Assumptions, Notations and Problem Formulation
To isolate the impact of scheduling on the system performance, we rule out
the presence of other disruptions in the system. The basic assumptions are
listed as follows:
1. The sequence of patient arrivals is xed. Service occurs in the same
sequence4.
2. Patients arrive punctually at the scheduled appointment times5.
3. There is a single doctor in the facility. The doctor arrives punctually
4 This assumption is relaxed when we study the sequencing problem in section 3.8
5 This assumption can be relaxed. In Section 3.5.2, we demonstrate how to extend our
model to incorporate late arrivals.
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and only serves the scheduled patients during the session. No break is
taken during the time serving one patient.
4. Patients in the same class are homogenous in the distribution of con-
sultation durations.
5. Walk-in and emergency patients are not considered.
Note that in a typical appointment scheduling problem, it is common
for the patients to choose the appointment slots in a dynamic fashion, and
their characteristics, such as mean and standard deviation of service time, are
known only at the time of booking. The problem described above matches
more the surgery scheduling environment. However, in certain appointment
scheduling environments, patients are classied into distinct classes and each
appointment slot in a single clinical session is pre-assigned to a dedicated class
of patients. The slots are lled up when patients call in for appointments
and their classications are revealed. We assume that the clinic has enough
volume to ll up the slots available in each day. In this way, the scheduling
problem described here essentially addresses the design of the appointment
system based on the patient classications, not on the characteristics of in-
dividual patients.
Let N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng be the index set for all patients, and the se-
quence of arrivals is 1; 2; : : : ; n. Let ~ui be the random service time of pa-
tient i, i = 1; 2; : : : ; n. We dene s = fs1; s2;    ; sngT , where si rep-
resents the length of time slot scheduled for ith patient in the sequence.
Therefore, the appointment time of the patients in the sequence is given by
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We assume that ~ui follows a distribution with mean i and standard de-
viation i, and P(~ui  0) = 1, i.e., ~ui has nonnegative support. Let wi denote
the waiting time of the ith patient in the sequence. It is reasonable to assume
that the rst session starts at time zero, i.e., w1 = 0. Dene ~ci to be the dif-
ference between the actual consultation time and the allocated consultation
interval of the ith patient in the sequence, i.e., ~ci = ~ui si; i = 1; : : : ; n: Then
the waiting time of subsequent patients are given by the following recursions:









; i = 2; 3; : : : ; n: (3.1)
If there were an additional \auxiliary" patient (i.e., the (n + 1)st pa-
tient) arriving at the end of the consultation session, then the doctor's
overtime would be exactly the waiting time of this patient, i.e., wn+1 =
max f0; wn + ~cng : In this topic, we will use the total patients' waiting time
and doctor's overtime (i.e.,
Pn
k=1wk and wn+1) as the key performance indi-
cators of the appointment system. The objective of the appointment schedul-
ing problem is to minimize the expectation of the weighted sum of the pa-








3. Topic 2: Appointment System Design using Copositive Cones 53
where i; i = 1; 2; : : : ; n+1 are the corresponding weights (or the unit waiting
time/overtime cost). We rst assume that i = 1 for all i = 1; : : : ; n+1, and
then relax this assumption in Section 3.5.
Note that the doctor's total idle time during the session is also a crucial
performance indicator of the appointment system. When the consultation
interval (i.e., the session length, denoted as T ) is pre-determined, the total
idle time is T + wn+1  
Pn
i=1 ~ui. Hence, we do not include the doctor's
idle time in the objective since adding the expected total idle time can only
cause the objective function to dier by a constant and the weight of wn+1
to increase by 1.
The technical diculty associated with the scheduling problem is par-
tially due to the computation of









; i = 2; 3; : : : ; n:
We introduce a two stage stochastic optimization framework to tackle this
problem. In the rst stage, the appointment scheduling decisions are made
under the objective to minimize the expected total waiting time cost6 dened
in equation (3.2). In the second stage, the patients' service durations are
realized and the system performance is determined. Let us consider the
second stage problem rst.
6 In the rest of this topic, we use the phrase \the total waiting time (cost)" to include
both of the waiting time (costs) of all the patients and the overtime (cost) of the doctor.
3. Topic 2: Appointment System Design using Copositive Cones 54
3.4.2 The Second Stage Problem
Given the schedule of the patients (i.e., s is known), the total waiting time
cost in equation (3.2) can be computed by solving a network ow problem
on a directed acyclic graph shown in Figure 3.2, with n + 1 supply nodes
and a sink node s. The cost on arc (i; s) is 0, and the cost on arc (i+ 1; i)
is ~ci(s) = ~ui   si, where the notation ~ci(s) is used here to emphasize the
dependencies of ~ci on the given schedule s (not in the gure). The capacities
for all the arcs are innite. Let yi, i = 1; 2; : : : ; n, be the ows on arc (i+ 1; i),
and zi, i = 1; 2; : : : ; n+ 1 be the ows on arc (i; s).
Fig. 3.2: Network ow representation of the appointment scheduling problem
Proposition 3. Given the schedule s, the optimal cost of the following maxi-
mum cost ow problem equals the total waiting time cost of the system under
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any realization of ~u:




s:t: y1   z1 =  1
yi   yi 1   zi =  1; 8i = 2; 3; : : : ; n
 yn   zn+1 =  1
yi  0; 8i = 1; 2; : : : ; n
zi  0; 8i = 1; 2; : : : ; n+ 1
Proof. The proposition can be easily veried through tracking the ow of
each unit of supply at node 1; 2; : : : n+1. A detailed argument can be found
in Appendix A.
Remark 1. Note that Proposition 3 is developed in the deterministic situa-
tion. In the second stage, the patients' service durations are realized, i.e.,
they can be considered as deterministic. Then the network optimization
problem in Proposition 1 is proposed to nd out the total waiting time cost
under this realization. When the patients' service durations (~c(s)) become
stochastic, the optimal value of the network ow problem (f(s; ~u)) also be-
comes stochastic and depends on ~c(s).
Removing one redundant network ow conservation constraint and using
the matrix notation, we rewrite f (s; ~u) as follows for the ease of exposition:
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f (s; ~u) = max ~cT (s)y
s:t: a(j)Ty   e(j)Tz =  1; 8j = 1; 2; : : : n
y;z  0
where ~c (s) = (~c1(s); ~c2(s); : : : ; ~cn(s))
T , y = (y1; y2; : : : ; yn)
T , and z = (z2; z3; : : : ; zn+1)
T ;
and e(j) 2 Rn is the unit vector with its jth entry being one; and a(j)j =  1
for j = 1; : : : n, a(j)j+1 = 1 for j = 1; : : : ; n  1, and a(j)k = 0 otherwise.
3.4.3 The First Stage Problem
As mentioned before, we will deploy the minimax approach in our modeling
framework, which we need to address before solving the scheduling problem.
Under a xed schedule s, when the service durations become stochastic, but
with given moment conditions, the maximal expected total waiting time cost
can be written as:
(P) ZP (s) := sup
~u(;)+
fE[f (s; ~u)]g
where ~u  (;)+ denotes that the distribution of ~u lies in the set of feasible
multivariate distributions supported on Rn+ with nite rst moment  and
nite second moment . We assume this set to be nonempty. The challenge
to solve (P) reduces to the following: can one nd a distribution for the
random variable ~u in such a way that
P (~u  0) = 1; E [ ~u] = ; E ~u~uT  = ;
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attains the maximum ZP (s)? In general, if the
maximum cannot be attained, can one nd a sequence of random variables
so that ZP can be attained asymptotically?
It turns out that this problem can be reformulated into a conic program-
ming problem through a moment decomposition approach. Before showing
the main result, we introduce some necessary notations, and briey review
related subjects on the conic optimization problem.
Notations and A Brief Review of Conic Optimization
The trace of a matrix A, denoted by tr(A), is the sum of the diagonal entries
of A. The inner product between matrices A and B of the same dimensions is
denoted as A B = tr(ATB). In represents the identity matrix of dimension
nn, while 0mn is used to denote the zero matrix of dimension mn. We
may drop the subscript when it represents a zero vector of an appropriate
dimension that is obvious.
For any cone K, its dual cone is denoted as K. Let Sn denote the cone of
nn symmetric matrices, and S+n denote the cone of nn positive semidef-
inite matrices. A  0 indicates that the matrix A is positive semidenite,
and B  A is equivalent to B   A  0. Similarly, A  0 indicates that the
matrix A has nonnegative entries, and B  A is equivalent to B   A  0.
Two cones of special interest are the cone of completely positive matrices
and the cone of copositive matrices. The cone of n  n completely positive
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matrices is dened as
CPn :=





vvT : v 2 Rn+
	
;




A 2 Sn : 8v 2 Rn+; vTAv  0
	
:
A cp (co) 0 indicates that matrix A is completely positive (copositive).
These two cones are both closed, convex, pointed and of course, and have
nonempty interior. Moreover, they are duals of each other (cf. Berman
and Shaked-Monderer (2003)). A linear program over the cone of copositive
matrices is called a copositive program (COP), whose dual problem is a linear
program over the cone of completely positive matrices known as a completely
positive program (CPP).
Despite the nice properties of these two cones, it is widely believed that
their membership status is NP-hard to check. For instance, the problem of
testing if a given matrix is copositive is known to be co-NP-complete (cf.
Murty et al. (1987)). In a recent paper, Dickinson & Gijben (2011) showed
that the membership problems for both copositive and completely positive
cones are NP-hard. Fortunately, there are well-known hierarchies of linear
and semidenite representable cones that approximate the copositive and
completely positive cones (cf. Bomze et al. (2000), Klerk et al. (2002), Parrilo
(2000)). In this topic, we restrict our attention to the simplest relaxations
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of CPP and COP for the numerical experiments, i.e.,
8><>: A cp 0  A  0, and A  0A co 0  9A1  0, and A2  0, such that A = A1 + A2: (3.3)
More information on CPP and COP can be found in Berman and Shaked-
Monderer (2003).
Moment Decomposition and Conic Representation
For ease of exposition, we dene x = (yT ; zT )T , and rewrite the network ow

































:   0; t 2 Rn+; v 2 R2n+ ; Av = b
9>>>>=>>>>; : (3.4)
From the denition of CPn, we know that D is indeed the intersection of the
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completely positive cone, CP3n+1 with a hyperplane in R2n+1 projected onto
R3n+1 (i.e., a polyhedral cone in R3n+1). Furthermore, if  = 0, then Av = 0



































where K+ and K0 are the corresponding indicator sets, and they can be
chosen to be nite7 (c.f. Berman and Shaked-Monderer (2003)).
If Z1;1 = 1, then (k)
2 can be interpreted as the probability of the
kth scenario with service duration ~u = t(k)=(k), and solution x(s; ~u) =
(y(s; ~u);z(s; ~u)) = v(k)=(k). The corresponding objective function in the
kth scenario is given by
Pn
i=1(~ui si)y(s; ~u)i: Averaging over all the scenarios
each with probability (k)2, we get the objective function given by Y (s)Z,
where Y (s) is a (3n+ 1) (3n+ 1) symmetric matrix dened as
Y (s) =
0BBBBBBB@
0 01n  sT2 01n






0n1 0nn 0nn 0nn
1CCCCCCCA
:
The second term in the expression for Z in (3.5) can be viewed as a char-
acterization of the null set for the corresponding probability space. With
7 Indeed, not only they could be nite, but also bounded. This is related to the concept
of cp-rank, details of which can be found in Berman and Shaked-Monderer (2003).
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such moment decomposition interpretation, we get the following optimiza-
tion problem by incorporating other moment conditions:
(C) Z 0P (s) := max Y (s)  Z
s:t: Z1;1 = 1; Z1;i+1 = i; Zi+1;j+1 = i;j; 8i; j = 1; : : : ; n
Z 2 D
Furthermore, we can prove that the above conic optimization problem is
indeed equivalent to problem (P).
Proposition 4. For any given schedule s, Z 0P (s) = ZP (s).
Proof. There are two steps involved in the proof. Firstly, we show that
problem (C) provides an upper bound for (P), i.e. Z 0P (s)  ZP (s), 8s. Next,
through a constructive approach, we nd a sequence of random vectors, ~u
that satises the moment conditions in the limiting sense and E [f (s; ~u)]
converges to Z 0P (s) when  converges to zero, i.e., the bound provided by (C)
is tight. The technical details are omitted here but available in Appendix B.
Now we have a conic maximization problem that solves problem (P)
exactly. To incorporate the scheduling decision s, we still need one more
step, which is taking the dual of problem (P).
Remark 2. Note that our conic optimization model resembles the results of
Natarajan et al. (2009) from a dierent perspective. Instead of separating
the moment requirement on ~u and the feasibility conditions on x and then
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enforcing their relationship through a lifting constraint, we directly charac-
terize the cone D from the moment decomposition angle. One of the advan-
tages of the new perspective is that it makes the regularity condition for the
strong conic duality self-evident, in particular, Slater's constraint qualica-
tion. We will elaborate more on the dual problem in the following analysis.
Another important advantage is that it can be extended into a much more
general conic framework for a stochastic optimization problem, which will be
discussed in Section 3.5.4.
Conic Duality and Copositive Program
Let D denote the dual cone of D, i.e., D = fW : Z W  0; 8Z 2 Dg.
Then the dual of problem (C), denoted by ZD (s), can be written as follows:





























0n1 0nn 0nn 0nn
1CCCCCCCA
W 2 D
where  2 R,  2 Rn and   2 Rnn are the corresponding dual variables of
the moment constraints.
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1CA  (~u  s)Ty(s; ~u):













8><>:(~u  s)Ty(s; ~u) : A
0B@ y(s; ~u)
z(s; ~u)
1CA = b; ~u  0; y(s; ~u)  0; z(s; ~u)  0
9>=>; :
Then the weak duality ZD (s)  ZP (s) follows immediately. Furthermore,
since problem (P) is obviously bounded, so is (C). Then as long as D has a
nonempty relative interior, by the Slater's constraint qualication, there is
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no duality gap between the primal ZP (s) and its dual ZD (s). Note that D
needs not be full dimensional for the strong duality to hold. We use a simple
example in Appendix C to illustrate this.
To convert ZD (s) into a copositive programming problem, we need to


















; i = 1; 2; : : : ; n;
where ATi is the i
th row vector of A, i.e., ATi =
















1CCCCA = (ATi v   bi)2 = 0 if and only if ATi v = bi:
Hence, with a simple justication, we get
D = fZ : Z Mi = 0; 8i = 1; 2; : : : ; n; Z 2 CP3n+1g ; (3.6)
and it can be easily veried that
D =
(
W : W = V +
nX
i=1
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Therefore, we obtain the follow formulation for the appointment schedul-
ing problem:









































where the decision variables are  2 R,  2 Rn,   2 Rnn,  2 Rn and
s 2 Rn. The last constraint connes the choice of s to a feasible set 
s. For
example, s 2 
s in our case is
nX
i=1
si  T , and si  0; 8i = 1; 2; : : : ; n; (3.8)
which means the time slots must be nonnegative and the total scheduled time
cannot exceed the session time T . We assume T > 0.








fE [f (s; ~u)]g
)
= ZS
Remark 3. With the compact formulation of ZS, we are then able to analyti-
cally investigate the structure of the optimal scheduling policy. Furthermore,
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computationally we can solve the relaxation of ZS as a semidenite program-
ming problem as mentioned before.
3.5 Extensions
In this section, we show that our model can be extended to capture more
features of the practical appointment scheduling problem, while still main-
taining a formulation that is a compact convex conic optimization problem.
3.5.1 General Waiting Time Costs
In the earlier discussion, we have assumed i = 1 for all patients. The
network ow model used in the second stage problem can be extended to
cope with general waiting time costs i. This can be achieved by simply
changing the in-ow at each node i from 1 to i, and the out-ow at node s
from n + 1 to
Pn+1
i=1 i. The reader can easily verify that the total waiting
time cost is now mapped to the maximum cost ow problem in the network
with the new supply and demand parameters.
3.5.2 Eye test before consultation (Late arrivals)
Suppose that the ith patient in the sequence has to undertake a test prior
to the consultation. The test is often handled by a nurse and can be ad-
ministered immediately upon arrival. The duration of the test is random
and denoted by the random variable ~li. We dene the waiting time of the
patients to be the waiting time needed to consult the doctor after the test is
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administered. We also assume that the patients are seen by the doctor in
the same sequence based on the appointment time, i.e., the sequence of the
patients seen by the doctors is the same as the sequence of arrival. In this
case, we can also use the network ow model to capture the impact of the
test on the performance of the system. This is achieved by changing the cost
on arcs (i; s), i = 1; 2; : : : ; n, from 0 to the random variables, ~li. Then the
network ow solution in our model corresponds to the total waiting time cost


















s:t: y1   z1 =  1
yi   yi 1   zi =  1; 8i = 2; 3; : : : ; n
 yn   zn+1 =  1
yi  0; 8i = 1; 2; : : : ; n
zi  0; 8i = 1; 2; : : : ; n+ 1
To see this, note that when zi = 1, the i
th patient nishes the eye test and
nds the doctor to be idling. This patient gets to consult the doctor at time
~li after arrival. The waiting time is thus zero. This starts a new busy period,
with the initial consultation duration given by ~li+~ci(s), so we need to oset
the objective by ~li. On the other hand, if after the test, the patient nds the
doctor to be busy, then zi = 0 in the network ow solution, and hence the
waiting time is simply the length of the longest path originating from node
i deducted by ~li.
Then it is clear that we can extend the denition of the cone D8 to
capture the impact of ~l just as ~u, and nally we can still arrive at a convex
8 More precisely, the new dimension of D is (4n+ 1) (4n+ 1).
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conic optimization formulation for the appointment scheduling problem with
random prior tests. Note that the eect of such tests is exactly the same
as late arrivals, i.e. patients arriving at a random time after the scheduled
appointment. Thus, we can also address the issue of late arrivals with the
same approach described above.
3.5.3 Relationship to Scenario Planning
In our model, we assume that only the moments and covariance parameters
of the service durations are known. Then our model constructs a set of sce-
narios, the associated probability functions, and a solution which attains the
(worst case) performance objective under this set of scenarios. Our approach
can be easily augmented to include specic scenarios when describing the
uncertainty set for the service durations. More specically, suppose that the
system planner would like to construct the optimal schedule under the addi-
tional restrictions to include N scenarios uL with probability pL, such thatPN
L=1 pL = p  1. Furthermore, the conditional rst and second moments
for the remaining scenarios are denoted by (;)+. Then our model reduces
to
ZP (s) = (1  p) sup
~u(;)+




where f (s; ~u) is dened as before and
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fL (s; ~u) = max
nP
i=1
(uLi   si)  yLi
s:t: yL1   zL1 =  1
yLi   yLi 1   zLi =  1; 8i = 2; 3; : : : ; n
 yLn   zLn+1 =  1
yLi  0; 8i = 1; 2; : : : ; n
zLi  0; 8i = 1; 2; : : : ; n+ 1
In this way, we use a small set of scenarios to ensure that the optimal solution
constructed will not perform too badly for these typical scenarios, and hence
will not be overly conservative. Note that the dual to the above second stage
problem can be written using the approach described earlier, together with
standard linear programming duality.
When p = 1, ZP reduces to the conventional stochastic optimization
problem solved via the sampling method. Hence, this framework can be
viewed as a bridge between the traditional stochastic optimization and mod-
ern robust optimization.
3.5.4 Generalized Conic Framework for More Support Information
For the random service time, except the moment conditions, we only require
that they must be nonnegative. In general, there may be other conditions
that the system planner would like to impose on the random service time,
like a boundedness condition, etc. Our model provides a natural way to
incorporate more support information through the construction of the cone
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D. Recall in equation (3.6), we express D as
D = fZ : Z Mi = 0; 8i = 1; 2; : : : ; n; Z 2 CP3n+1g :
We can view D as the intersection of the completely positive cone CP3n+1
with
Mi := fZ : Z Mi = 0g ; i = 1; 2; : : : ; n:
While the network conservation constraints are embedded withinMi, CP3n+1
captures both the non-negativity constraints for the network ow variables
and nonnegative support requirement of the random service time. Thus, it
appears intuitive for us to augment CP3n+1 if we want to incorporate more
support conditions. In order to develop a more general framework, we need
the following lemma, which can be easily veried by the denition of a dual
cone.
Lemma 1. Suppose Kk  Rnn, k = 1; 2; : : : ;m, are closed convex cones.
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With Lemma 1, one can easily derive the expression of the dual cone
of D as shown in equation (3.7) by recognizing that the dual cone of Mi
is Mi := fiMi : i 2 Rg. Thus, as long as the extra support conditions
can be characterized with some conic constraints and their dual cones are
compactly representable, we could still obtain a single conic optimization
formulation for the appointment scheduling problem.
For example, if the system planner would like to add some boundedness
conditions for the the random service time, which is characterized by the
following ellipsoid constraint, i.e.,
( ~u  u)T Q (~u  u)  r with probability 1, for some Q 2 Sn  Rnn;u 2 Rn and r 2 R:
This constraint restricts the random service time to lie in an ellipsoid of size
r centered at u. Using the probabilistic interpretation of Z 2 D, we can
transform this condition into the following conic constraint on Z,
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Then the dual cone of  can be easily obtained using S-Lemma, i.e.,
 :=
8>>>><>>>>:V 2 R
(3n+1)(3n+1) : 9  0; such that V   
0BBBB@





which will translate into an extra semidenite constraint in the nal formu-




W : W = V1 + V2 +
nX
i=1
iMi; V1 2 CO3n+1; V2 2 ; i 2 R; i = 1; 2; : : : ; n
)
:
Following the similar argument in the proof of Proposition 4, one can
easily verify that the main result of our model (i.e., Theorem 1) still holds
with the modied D as shown above.
3.6 Model Analysis
Our model provides a single deterministic convex formulation to solve a two
stage stochastic optimization problem. To the best of our knowledge, this
model is the rst of its kind. Furthermore, as shown in the development
of the conic optimization model, the optimal solution to problem (C) has a
natural probabilistic interpretation under the worst case distribution. Note
that we can obtain the values of those (primal) variables in (C) by taking
the dual of (S). Together with the network ow formulation of the waiting
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time experienced, they provide a new way to obtain some insights into the
structure of the optimal appointment schedule. In the rest of this section,
we show that the solution obtained from this deterministic model retains
many of the intuitive properties of the optimal schedule under more realistic
probabilistic consultation service distributions. To maintain the ow of this
topic as well as to keep it succinct, we relegate all of the proofs in this section
to Appendix D. In terms of notation, we use the asterisk sign () to indicate
the respective optimal solution. For example, si denotes the optimal solution
of si in problem (S).
We show rst that if there is a need to bunch the arrival of patients
together, then it is optimal to bunch the arrivals at the end of the session.
This is intuitive because whenever the consultation time is modeled by a
non-negative distribution, if bunching occurs for the (i 1)st and ith patient,
but not the (i + 1)st patient, then it is optimal to schedule the arrival of
the ith patient slightly later and keep the schedule of the (i + 1)st patient
unchanged. The reason is obvious since the ith patient has to wait almost
surely if she comes at the same time as the (i   1)st patient. The optimal
schedule in our model retains this feature.
Proposition 5. Let the waiting time costs and overtime cost be strictly pos-
itive. In any optimal solution s to problem (S), let I be the set of allo-
cated service times, which are zero, i.e., I := fi : si = 0g. Then I =
fn  jIj+ 1; : : : ; n  1; ng, i.e., I is the last jIj members of f1; 2; : : : ; ng.
Remark 4. Note that in the numerical studies that we will present in Section
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3.7, there is also a bunching eect appearing at the beginning of the session.
However, those slots at the beginning of the session are not exactly zero, but
very small positive values. Such phenomenon would rise in the optimal policy
for a heavily congested system, where every patient has to wait almost surely
(with probability close to 1), details of which will be analyzed in Section 3.7.
In a practical settings, the nonnegativity constraints on the consultation
slots (i.e., si  0;8i = 1; 2; : : : ; n) enforce that all the appointment times
are within the consultation session (T ). Intuitively, if the system is heavily
congested, it may be optimal to schedule some patients to arrive after time
T . To incorporate this into our model, we may remove the nonnegativity
constraints on the consultation slots. The next proposition shows that if
these nonnegativity constraints are removed, only the last slot (sn) can be
negative in the optimal schedule as long as the costs of waiting time and
overtime are strictly positive. Note that the scheduled arrival time of the
nth patient is
Pn 1
i=1 si and is therefore larger than T if sn < 0, becausePn
i=1 si = T . Furthermore, the constraint
Pn
i=1 si = T ensures that the
counting of the doctor's overtime starts from time T , and sn < 0 in the
network ow structure indicates that the doctor's overtime (i.e., the (n+1)th
patient's waiting time) is at least  sn > 0.
Proposition 6. Suppose the nonnegativity constraints on consultation slots
(i.e., the second set of constraints in equation (3.8)) are removed. When
the waiting time costs and overtime cost are strictly positive, in the optimal
solution to problem (S), there is at most one negative slot. Furthermore, if
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this negative slot exists, it must be the last one, i.e., si > 0; 8i = 1; 2; : : : ; n 
1; and sn < 0.
We investigate next the probability of a patient arriving at the scheduled
time to nd the system busy. From Figure 3.2, the ow yi merges with i at
node i. The probability that this combined ow goes through arc (i; i  1) is
exactly the probability that the ith patient has to wait. Otherwise, the ow
on arc (i; i  1) would be zero, which indicates that the waiting time cost is
zero for the ith patient since arc (i; s) has zero ow cost. More precisely,
E[yi 1(s; ~u)] = E[E[yi 1(s; ~u)jyi(s; ~u)]]
= E[(yi(s; ~u) + i)  Prfith patient has to waitg]
= (E[yi(s; ~u] + i)  Prfith patient has to waitg
=) Prfith patient has to waitg = E[yi 1(s; ~u)]
E[yi(s; ~u)] + i
:
Since the optimal s is selected to minimize










(~ui   si)yi(s; ~u)
#
;
From the rst order optimality conditions, we expect that at the optimal s,
if si 1 > 0 and s

i > 0, then E[yi 1(s
; ~u)] = E[yi(s; ~u)]. This holds indeed
for the optimal schedule obtained using our model.
Proposition 7. If in the optimal solution to problem (S), the allocated service
time slots are strictly positive, (i.e., si > 0, 8i 2 I  1; 2; : : : ; n), then the
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network ow solution must satisfy E[yi(s
; ~u)]  K, 8i 2 I, where K is some
nonnegative constant.
Combining the propositions established thus far, we can derive an im-
portant optimality condition for an appointment system:
Theorem 2. Suppose in the optimal solution to problem (S), the allocated
consultation slots are strictly positive for the rst k patients, (i.e., si > 0,
8i = 1; 2; : : : ; k, where 0 < k  n). Furthermore, if i  , for some constant
 > 0, for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; k, then the probabilities of waiting for the service
are the same for all the patients from i = 2; : : : ; k, under the optimal worst
case distribution.
Remark 5. Note that the optimality condition stated in the above theorem
is independent of the sequence of the patients. This property of the optimal
schedule is particularly useful for the patients: there is little incentive to
choose between the slots in the clinical session if the objective is to minimize
the chances of waiting for the service.
3.7 Computational Results
All the computational studies are carried out in MATLAB on a Dell desktop
(Core 1.86 GHz and 3GB of RAM). We solve the simplest form of SDP
relaxation of the COP and CPP as shown in equation (3.3). In MATLAB,
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we use YALMIP as the programming interface with SDPT3 as the underlying
SDP solver (cf. Lofberg (2004), Toh et al. (1999), Tutuncu et al. (2003)).
Note that expressing a problem as a COP or CPP and relaxing it only
partially resolve the diculty of the problem, because even solving a large-
scale SDP can be computationally inhibitive. Since our model lifts the orig-
inal problem into a cone with higher dimensions, the current computational
power limits the size of the problem instance we can solve to around 36 pa-
tients. While it is an interesting challenge to push the computational limit
of this approach further, we leave this to future research. By \large-scale
problem", we mean problems that involve hundreds or even thousands of
variables. Fortunately, in practice we usually will not encounter such large
sized problems. In the eye clinic case, we only need to schedule 36 patients
for the whole morning session.
In what follows, we use extensive numerical experiments to provide a
glimpse into the performance of the optimal scheduling solutions obtained
using our model.
3.7.1 Comparison with near-optimal solutions
In this section, we test the performance of our model against a set of near
optimal solutions given in Denton & Gupta (2003). Table 3.1 lists the near
optimal schedules given in that paper, for 7 jobs with identically independent
distributed service time (Uniform(0; 2)) under dierent cost structures and
xed session length T = 7. The waiting time costs are identical among all
the patients. In their numerical results, the optimality gap is less than 1%.
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We compute problem (S) to obtain the optimal schedule that minimizes the
worst-case cost under all distributions with mean 1 and standard deviation
1=
p
3. The results of our model are presented in Table 3.2. Note that in
Denton & Gupta (2003), the objective function is the weighted sum of to-
tal waiting time, idle time and overtime of the doctor, while in our model
the objective function does not include the cost of idle time. According to
Proposition 1 in Denton & Gupta (2003) (similar to our argument in Section
3.4.1), we can transform the optimal scheduling problem in Denton & Gupta
(2003) equivalently into our problem by combining the cost of idle time and
overtime. Since Denton & Gupta (2003) allows negative schedules, we re-
move the non-negativity constraints in equation (3.8) when solving problem
(S) for a fair comparison.
(1; n+1) (3,14) (5,12) (7,10) (3,12) (5,10) (7,8) (3,10) (5,8) (7,6)
s1 0.61 0.83 1.06 0.65 0.88 1.14 0.72 1.00 1.25
s2 1.09 1.18 1.27 1.11 1.22 1.34 1.13 1.25 1.38
s3 1.08 1.20 1.26 1.11 1.24 1.31 1.12 1.25 1.38
s4 1.09 1.20 1.27 1.13 1.22 1.32 1.13 1.25 1.38
s5 1.07 1.10 1.21 1.05 1.14 1.25 1.08 1.19 1.35
s6 0.94 1.00 1.16 0.96 1.01 1.20 0.94 1.07 1.24
s7 1.14 0.50 -0.23 1.01 0.31 -0.56 0.89 -0.01 -0.98
Tab. 3.1: Optimal schedules from Denton & Gupta (2003) under dierent cost
structures
Next, we compare the total waiting time costs under the schedules given
in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 through Monte Carlo simulation. In evaluating our
model, the service duration of each patient is generated under four common
distributions used in practice: uniform, normal, two-point and Gamma dis-
tribution, with mean 1 and standard deviation 1=
p
3. All 9 dierent cost
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(1; n+1) (3,14) (5,12) (7,10) (3,12) (5,10) (7,8) (3,10) (5,8) (7,6)
s1 0.35 0.87 0.94 0.52 0.89 0.99 0.76 0.92 1.05
s2 1.32 1.09 1.16 1.22 1.10 1.20 1.08 1.13 1.26
s3 1.05 1.17 1.25 1.08 1.19 1.30 1.11 1.22 1.38
s4 1.12 1.29 1.38 1.16 1.31 1.44 1.21 1.35 1.53
s5 1.20 1.31 1.36 1.23 1.31 1.42 1.26 1.33 1.50
s6 1.17 1.27 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.25 1.24 1.18 1.33
s7 0.79 0.00 -0.29 0.58 0.00 -0.61 0.33 -0.14 -1.04
Tab. 3.2: Optimal schedules from our model under dierent cost structures
structures are tested. 50,000 rounds of simulation are executed for each of
the 36 scenarios (4 distributions  9 costs structures)9. The average total
costs under dierent scenarios are then compared with the corresponding
benchmark schedules given by Denton & Gupta (2003) under the uniform
distribution. As shown in Table 3.3 the schedules obtained from our model
work phenomenally well when evaluated against the benchmarks. The aver-
age total costs under our model is close to that of Denton & Gupta (2003)
even under dierent distributions. The gaps are within 2% and most of them
are less than 1%. Moreover, it is worthwhile to point out that the average
total costs of our schedules do not vary much under dierent distributions.
(1; n+1) (3,14) (5,12) (7,10) (3,12) (5,10) (7,8) (3,10) (5,8) (7,6)
Benchmark 23.32 27.03 28.50 21.42 24.51 25.02 19.43 21.69 20.94
Uniform 23.55 27.62 28.89 21.55 24.79 25.48 19.60 21.94 21.48
Normal 23.57 27.77 28.98 21.63 24.92 25.55 19.72 22.03 21.53
Two point 24.00 28.64 30.20 21.95 25.81 26.56 20.23 22.91 21.89
Gamma 22.73 27.53 28.87 20.93 25.08 25.84 19.48 22.10 22.21
Tab. 3.3: Comparison of the average total costs between the schedules obtained
by our model and Denton & Gupta (2003) under dierent distributions
9 We obtain similar results through the test under a larger set of distributions as well,
but only the four most commonly used distribution are reported in this paper.
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3.7.2 Empirical Study in an Eye Clinic
In this subsection, we examine the performance of the appointment system
in the eye clinic and apply the methodology we develop in section 3.5.4
to improving the performance of the system. We present numerical results
based on data collected from the eye clinic and discuss pertinent managerial
insights from our model.
Tan Tock Sin hospital, built in 1844 by the entrepreneur Tan Tock Sin,
is the second largest hospital in Singapore. The hospital's specialist clinics
serve around 1,500 patients daily and its Emergency Department attends
around 400 patients daily, making it one of the busiest clinics and emer-
gency departments. Hence, ecient appointment systems are crucial for the
hospital operation, to to regulate the usage of the costly equipment and pre-
cious resources in the system, and to enhance its service level and increase
customer satisfaction.
Our research is motivated by a visit to an eye clinic in Tan Tock Sin hos-
pital. In the clinic, there are two consultation sessions per day, each lasting
four hours from 8am to 12pm and from 1pm to 5pm. The number of doctors
available per session is around two to seven. Each doctor has to handle 20
to 30 patients per session. Patients are classied into \new patients" and
\repeat patients". New patients refer to those who visit the doctor for the
treatment of a new problem and whose eye conditions are unknown to the
doctors they see; while repeat patients are those who have visited the clinic
before and who go there for follow-up checks. Their appointment strategy is
to 1) assign new patients to come at the beginning of the session; 2) allocate
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5 minutes per patient slot for one hour, followed by a half hour break.
We collect a dataset on the visits of 1021 patients during 7 working days
from 22 May, 2006 to 30 May, 2006. Among them, there are 201 new patients
(around 20%) and 820 repeat patients (around 80%). The data set consists of
the date, patient type, patient's NRIC, type of services, starting and ending
time of each service, service durations etc. The clinic uses the \Turnaround
Time" (TAT) as one key performance indicator. The number of doctors varies
from session to session. Sometimes there are only 2-3 doctors on duty while
some day there are 6-7 doctors. The number of patients varies accordingly.
Table 3.4 summarizes patients classications, workload, and median TAT
in each of the 7 days10. From the table we can see that the ratio of new
patients to repeat is roughly around 1:4 and the workload aects the TAT
signicantly.
Date 22-05 23-05 24-05 25-05 26-05 29-05 30-05
No. of Doctors 5 4.5 5 5 3 4 5.5
No. of Patients 136 162 155 126 106 146 190
New Patients 25 36 25 28 18 19 50
Repeat Patients 111 126 130 98 88 127 140
Median TAT 1:27 1:39 1:33 1:10 1:06 1:32 1:45
Tab. 3.4: Patients Classications and Median TAT
A typical visit to the eye clinic usually includes the following several
steps11:
 Registration
 Vision Test (Visual Acuity, Eye Pressure etc.)
10 Note that the number of doctors per day takes average on the number of patients in
the morning session and afternoon session.
11 Please refer to Liang (2006)for more detailed descriptions.
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 Consultation
 Specialized Eye Tests (Refraction, Dilation, Visual Field Test etc.)
 Payment and scheduling of follow-up appointment
Besides, a patient (especially a new one) may go through several con-
sultation during one visit. There is usually one major consultations and
normally takes the longest time. We record the duration of the longest con-
sultation of each patient and assume it is the length of a major consultation.
Figure 3.3 depicts the variations of consultation durations of new and re-
peat patients. It can be seen that the mean and variance of the consultation
times of the new patients are noticeably higher than those of repeat patients.
Specically, the mean and standard deviation of the consultation time of the
repeat patients are 6.24 minutes and 6.0 minutes respectively, while those for
the new patients are noticeably higher, with a mean of 9.97 minutes and a
standard deviation of 7.6 minutes.
In the following, I apply the methodology we develop in section 3.5.4
to obtaining optimal schedules for the eye clinic. I discuss the structural
properties of the optimal schedules under dierent overtime cost and propose
implementable heuristics. Then I run computational studies to compare the
performances of the optimal schedules, heuristic solutions and the current
appointment strategy.
In this experiment, we assume that one session lasts for 150 minutes.
This mimics the current practice with one hour block, followed by a half
hour break and then another one hour block. During one session, 24 patients
are scheduled to arrive in the clinic, with 5 new patients arriving before 19
3. Topic 2: Appointment System Design using Copositive Cones 83



















New Patients Repeat Patients
Fig. 3.3: Consultation durations of new and repeat patients
repeat patients. The consultation durations follow the distributions with the
mean and standard deviation as estimated by the empirical data. Note that
the sum of mean service durations of all patients is 168.41 minutes, which is
larger than the session length. This indicates that the system may be heavily
congested.
The patient's waiting time cost (i) is assumed to be identical among
all the patients and normalized to 1. We test various overtime costs, i.e.,
n+1 = 1, 20 or 40. Figure 3.4 plots the optimal schedules obtained by our
model under dierent n+1.
It is interesting to note that the optimal schedules exhibit the pattern
of \Bailey's Rule + Break". First, the optimal schedule allocates near zero
time slot to the rst few patients. Although Proposition 5 indicates that all
the zero time slots should be placed at the end of the session, the time slots
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Fig. 3.4: Optimal schedule when n+1 is equal to 1, 20 and 40, given 1=1
for the rst few patients are indeed strictly positive but extremely small, as
the system is heavily congested and the overtime costs are large enough to
induce such scheduling rules. The second outstanding feature is that, after
serving the group of new patients, a break is inserted before switching to the
group of repeat patients with lower variability. To conrm this feature, we
run another group of experiments with 3 classes of patients. Similar patterns
are observed - breaks are inserted after serving the rst and the second class
of patients.
One drawback of the optimal schedule is that it is generally not practical
and is non-intuitive. To x this problem, we try to use the above insights to
develop a simple but eective appointment schedule. In the current practice,
each patient is assigned with an equal interval of 5 minutes and a 30 minutes
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break is inserted after seeing 12 patients. We simply modify the \Current
Practice" by replacing the 30 minutes break after serving all the new patients,
i.e. after the 5th patient. We call this schedule \Modied Practice".
In a more advanced system design, we allow the allocated service inter-
vals to vary according to the mean service duration of each patient, denoted
as the \Varying Interval" schedule. To resemble the optimal schedule (un-
der n+1 = 1), we assign zero time slots to the rst patient and the last six
patients. Other patients are assigned with time slots by rounding up their
mean service durations, i.e., 10 minutes for a new patient and 7 minutes for
a repeat patient. The remaining time is combined and inserted after the 5th
patient as a break.
Uniform Normal Two-points Gamma
Optimal Schedule 352.58 349.80 355.37 352.78
Current Practice 564.13 560.18 570.31 535.37
Modied Practice 485.36 479.95 491.95 462.44
Varying Interval 358.24 353.61 363.60 354.83
Tab. 3.5: Average total waiting time cost under dierent scheduling policies when
1 = 1 and n+1 = 1
The simulated performance of various policies under dierent service
time distributions are shown in Table 4. Implementing a schedule resem-
bling the optimal solution dramatically decreases the total waiting time cost
by about 35% as compared to the current practice. Interestingly, it seems
that one can signicantly improve the performance of the system by simply
inserting a break after serving one class of patients in the optimal scheduling.
The easily implemented \Varying Interval" strategy makes it quite attractive
for the practical considerations.
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Note that the above simulation results are obtained under n+1 = 1. In
most environment, the overtime cost n+1 is likely to be large and should
be proportional to the number of patients seen in the clinic. The choice of
n+1 = 1 is thus a conservative estimate and assumes the doctor places small
penalty on the overtime work. In what follows, we summarize the features
of optimal schedules when n+1 increases. The pattern of \Bailey's Rule
+ Break" seems to be quite robust no matter how the the overtime cost
changes. Besides this, Figure 3.4 also illustrates several interesting features:
As n+1 increases,
 more patients are assigned with near zero consultation time slots at the
beginning of the session;
 fewer patients are assigned with zero time slots at the end of the session;
 a longer time slot is assigned to the last patient.
Intuitively, all these features benet a clinic that prefers a shorter over-
time. Consequently, patients may suer from longer waiting times as a result.
As we can see, the optimal properties persist as the overtime cost n+1
increases. One question is that whether we can still design ecient appoint-
ment systems with the help of the optimal properties under dierent overtime
costs. To answer this question, we rst solve the optimal schedules when n+1
is 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, and 100, and then create the \Varying Interval" schedules
using the following heuristics: allocate zero time slots to those clustering pa-
tients (with zero or close to zero time slots) at the beginning and the end of
the session, assign the rest of the patients their mean consultation durations,
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and insert the remaining time as a break after the 5th patient.We simulate
the total costs of the \Varying Interval" schedules and compare with current
practice. Table 3.7.2 records the eciency gains under dierent overtime
costs n+1. The percentage savings decrease as rhon+1 is increased. The
eciency gain drops to around 30% when n+1 = 2, to around 13% when
n+1 = 10, and to around 10% when n+1 = 100. Since a higher overtime
cost indicates larger total cost, a 10% eciency gain when n+1 = 100 can
save around 360 minutes in total waiting time. Hence, although eciency
gain drops as n+1 increases, employing the \Varying Interval" schedule can
still ensure signicant eciency improvements in the clinic. We simulate the
performances of the \Varying Interval" schedules and compare them against
those under the current strategy.
Percentage Increase
Overtime Uniform Normal Two-points Gamma
1 36.5% 37.1% 36.3% 33.7%
2 31.7% 32% 31.4% 28.5%
5 24% 24.3% 23.9% 21%
10 13.3% 13.4% 13.3% 10.1%
20 7.1% 7.3% 7.3% 4.2%
50 7.3% 6.8% 7.9% 5.5%
100 11.4% 11.5% 12.2% 9.7%
Tab. 3.6: Eciency gains under dierent overtime costs
3.8 Sequencing Problem
We have shown that the scheduling problem can be eectively solved using a
simple convex program. We discuss in the rest of this section some insights
on the optimal sequence of arrival of the patients. We assume si = i to
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remove the needs to address the scheduling decision, and focus solely on the
sequencing problem. We want to determine the sequence to minimize the
total waiting time, with i = 1 for i = 1; : : : ; n + 1, in our appointment
problem. In particular, we address the question: Is it optimal to sequence
the patients with smaller variance to arrive earlier in the session?
Although many current research conjecture that the smaller-variance-
rst rule might be optimal, the following example, unfortunately, shows that
this is not true in general.
Assume the service durations f~ig are independent. Let ~1 = 0 or 2
with equal probability, ~2; ~3 = 0 or 4 with equal probability, and ~k = 0
or 6 with equal probability for k > 3. In this case, P (~c1 = 1) = 12 ,
P (~cj = 2) = 12 , for j = 2; 3; and P (~ck = 3) = 12 , for k = 4; : : : ; n.
We compare the performance of the sequence f1; 2;    ; ng and another
obtained by switching 1 and 2 in the sequence. Note that patients in
the rst sequence are ordered in non-decreasing order of the variances.
We ran simulation and plot the dierence in the performance, ( i.e., the
dierence in total waiting time), as a function of the number of patients
n, in Figure 3.5.
As the number of patients is small, say n below 20, scheduling patients
with smaller variance rst is generally better in this example. Surpris-
ingly, this behavior changes as n increases, and for a large enough n,
putting patient 2 in front of patient 1 is now benecial in reducing total
waiting time! Consequently, sequencing patients in increasing variance is
no longer optimal. The simulation result also suggests that the optimal
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Fig. 3.5: Dierence in Performance w.r.t n
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sequence is aected by the number of patients in each class, and hence
sequencing patients by looking at pair of patients in isolation through
stochastic ordering is probably a futile attempt.
To add to the perplexity of the results, we show next that under the
deterministic model where si is set to a constant (e.g. patients scheduled to
arrive in constant interval), then knowing the service duration ~i in advance
does not make the sequencing problem any easier! In fact, under this deter-
ministic model, Vanden (1997) have shown earlier that when the objective
coecients i are allowed to take arbitrary values, to determine the optimal
sequence is equivalent to solve a nonlinear knapsack problem and is thus NP-
hard. Surprisingly, we show next that the problem in fact remains NP-hard
even when i's are identical.
Theorem 3. The appointment scheduling problem is NP -hard in the strong
sense, even if the allocated appointment interval Sj is constant for all j, and
i = 1 for all i.
We refer the readers to Appendix I for a formal proof of this result.
In the rest of this section, we describe how the proposed approach can
be used to address this class of sequencing problem, even when scheduling
decision has to be made in conjunction with the sequencing decision. Let
(P)' Z 0P = sup
U(;)+
fE[f(s; )]g
where f(s; ) is the cost of the second stage network ow model after xing
schedule s and sequence .
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To apply our approach on the appointment design problem, we introduce
scheduling and sequencing decision variables s and P = (pij) into the model
in the following way:
Theorem 4. (P)' can be solved as the following completely positive
program, i.e., Z 0P = Z
0
C :
















1CCA = 1; 8j = 1; 2; : : : n0BBBBBBBBBB@
1 T yT zT
  XT V T
y X Y W T
z V W Z
1CCCCCCCCCCA
cp 0
where the decision variables are y; z 2 Rn, Y; W; Z; X; V 2 Rnn, and
P = (pi;j) 2 f0; 1gnn is a known permutation matrix given by
pi;j =
8>><>>:
1 ; if (j) = i
0 ; otherwise
; i; j = 1; 2; : : : ; n:
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This formulation models the expected waiting cost of the appointment
system, when the sequencing decision P = (pi;j) and scheduling decision s are
xed. It replaces the objective function tr(X) byXP , due to the sequencing
consideration. The corresponding copositive cone program is now:



























































pj;i = 1; 8i = 1; 2; : : : ; n
pi;j 2 f0; 1g ; 8i; j = 1; 2; : : : ; n
s 2 
s
When the sequencing becomes parts of the decision variables, due to
its discrete nature (n2 binary variables), the time consumed in searching
for optimal sequence (e.g. using a Branch and Bound (B&B) type method)
increases exponentially in the size of the instance. We developed a simple
B&B code to take advantage of the special structure of the problem by adding
some symmetry breaking constraints, and can solve the sequencing problem
for up to 8 customers eciently.
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3.8.1 Numerical Results
Our earlier numerical examples have debunked the conjecture on the opti-
mality of the smaller-variance-rst rule. However, what is the structure of
the optimal sequencing policy? We use a set of numerical experiments to
provide a glimpse to the answer of this question.
The numerical example assumes 6 patients in the system, with identi-
cal mean consultation duration of 5 time units, but with dierent standard
deviations ([1 1 2 2 3 3]). By xing the allocated service time to be the mean
( = 5), we obtain the optimal sequences by solving the CPCMM model. In
Figure 3.6, we observe that when the ratio between waiting time cost (i)
and overtime cost (n+1) is 1 : 1, smaller-variance-rst rule is indeed optimal.
However, as the overtime cost is suciently high as compared to the waiting
time cost (e.g., 1:100), the optimal sequence appears to be \U-shaped" in
terms of the variability of the service durations. Namely, the patients with
larger variances are either assigned to the beginning or the end of the session.
Monte Carlo simulation results indeed show that under the \U-shape"
sequencing rule, the expected total cost is smaller than that under the
smaller-variance-rst rule. The above structure continues to hold for many
dierent sets of parameters in the experiments. We conjecture that it holds
in general:
[Conjecture]: When the allocated service time for each patient is
set to the mean service time and the overtime cost is suciently
high, the optimal sequence exhibits a U-shape pattern.
We leave the resolution to the above conjecture to future research.
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Fig. 3.6: Optimal sequencing under dierent cost structure and xed schedule
3.9 Conclusion
We propose a novel approach to deal with the dicult patient scheduling and
sequencing problem. Instead of planning against a xed service distribution,
we plan against a canonical set of service distributions with the same mean
and covariance parameters. The canonical distribution is \constructed" via
a copositive cone program. In this way, we reduce a dicult two stage
stochastic programming problem into a single stage convex programming
problem. Through extensive simulations we show that the optimal schedules
solved under the \worst case" give near-optimal solutions when the objective
is to minimize expected total cost. This approach allows us to shed some
light on the structure of the optimal schedule and sequence, which we can
readily modify to obtain practical and ecient schedule and sequence.
The approach can be generalized to deal with the situation when the
patients need to undergo a test (random duration) prior to the consultation,
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a pertinent feature in many eye clinic. The network ow approach can also be
conceivably extended to deal with other practical considerations in a clinical
environment. There are however several limitations with this approach -
the computational diculty associated with solving large scale SDP limits
our ability to solve large scale scheduling problem. Furthermore, we need
to devise a specialized Branch&Bound algorithm to deal with the case when
sequencing decision is involved. However, we hope that larger instances of
the sequencing problem can be solved if we move to a commercial platform
to deal with the 0-1 problem. We leave this for future research.
4. TOPIC 3: PATTERN RECOGNITION AND BIASED
PERCEPTION OF RANDOMNESS
4.1 Abstract
Loss of control generates the drive for human beings to seek patterns in their
daily lives. In this paper, we investigate how our perceptions of randomness
are shaped by this innate desire to nd patterns out of chaos. I use both the-
oretical and empirical methods to show that lottery players can be inuenced
to believe erroneously that the winning probabilities of past winning numbers
are higher in the current draw, even though the events are independent (i.e.
Hot-Hand Fallacy prevails). This result is surprising as works by Clotfelter
and Cook (1993) and Terrell (1994) have documented the presence of Gam-
bler's fallacy in the US lottery market instead - the amount of money bet on
a particular number in a pick-3 or pick-4 game falls sharply after the number
is drawn. I use two sets of lottery game data in Asia to show that Hot-Hand
Fallacy can prevail in a pick-3 or pick-4 game, and conclude that the design
of lottery games (e.g. prize structures) can inuence the perception of ran-
domness, and hence the two fallacies may dominate under dierent gaming
environments. These results have important implications as it indicates that
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people's perception of randomness, and thus behavior, can be manipulated
through appropriate design in the lottery game. Our results also provide an
explanation to a question raised in the \lucky store" eect paper by Guryan
and Kearney (2008) - why lottery players believe that lightning will strike
twice in the case of lottery vendors, but not in the case of numbers.
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4.2 Introduction
Ever since human ancestors looked at the starry sky and wondered how dif-
ferent combinations of stars foretold the future, pattern seeking has been en-
trenched in our daily lives. Our brains are well wired to constantly interpret
meanings out of (random) events happening in our lives and we search for
patterns to reassure us that life is \under control". Both anecdotal evidence
and research ndings show that when facing complex/uncertain situations,
our sense of control is threatened and we are more likely to impose rela-
tionships among unrelated events and perceive (illusory) patterns. Pattern
seeking undoubtedly has its survival value in the evolutional history of hu-
man beings (cf. Whiteson and Galinsky (2008), Proulx and Heine (2009),
and Beitman (2010) etc.) However, pattern seeking inevitably aects human
perceptions of randomness since it imposes connections between otherwise
possibly uncorrelated events. Important decisions under uncertainty heavily
rely on predictions of (random) future events. Therefore, careful investiga-
tion should be made to understand how the perception of randomness is
shaped by this deeply imbedded human nature.
People are known to rely on heuristics or simple mental models, rather
than theoretical models, to interpret random events (cf. Kahneman and
Tversky (1971), Hastie et al (2009) etc.). Among many others, Gambler's
Fallacy and Hot-Hand Fallacy are the most common biases in the percep-
tion of randomness. Gambler's Fallacy is an erroneous belief in the negative
correlation of independent outcomes generated by a random process; while
Hot-Hand Fallacy refers to the belief in positive correlations in the inde-
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pendent outcomes of a random process. Although the two fallacies seem
to contradict each other, current literature posits that the two fallacies are
related. They may arise from the same mechanism: belief in \the law of
small numbers" or \local representativeness" where small samples are used
to represent the characteristics of the total population. (cf. Rabin (2002),
Rabin and Vayanos (2010) etc.)
The earlier works focus on understanding the phenomenon that the
Gambler's and Hot-Hand Fallacy co-exist in the same individual. They iden-
tify the importance of the length of streaks (sequence of repeated events) in
inuencing the perception of randomness, i.e., Gambler's Fallacy prevails in
short streaks, but as the streaks lengthen, beliefs in Hot-Hand dominate (cf.
Asparouhva et al. (2009), Rabin and Vayanos (2010), Jorgensen et al (2011)).
On the other hand, observations that Gambler's Fallacy is more prevalent
in lottery games, and Hot-hand Fallacy more prevalent in games involving
skills, are often attributed to the \intentions" of the subjects involved. In
the recent work of Caruso et al. (2010), through a set of lab experiments,
they predict continuation of a streak when subjects involved are considered
to be intentional. Hence, when the streak is caused by some kind of me-
chanical device (as in lottery games), people believe the streak will end, i.e.,
Gambler's Fallacy dominates.
Recent led observation, however, suggests that Hot-Hand Fallacy can
prevail in a lottery game under appropriate conditions. In a pick-4 numbers
games, where there are multiple winning numbers in each draw, I nd that
punters bet more on previous winning numbers instead of avoiding them.
Figure 4.1 shows the 25th percentile, the median, and the 75th percentile
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of betting proportions of 2300 winning numbers on the day they are drawn
and the following 56 draws. Punters participating this game seem to believe
that the winning probabilities of past winning numbers are higher in the
current draw, even though the events are independent (i.e. Hot-Hand Fallacy
prevails). This result is surprising, as works by Clotfelter and Cook (1993)
and Terrell (1994) have documented the presence of Gambler's Fallacy in the
US lottery market instead - the amount of money bet on a particular number
in a pick-3 or pick-4 game falls sharply after the number is drawn.





















Fig. 4.1: Betting on Previous winning numbers
To reinforce the eld observations, I collect data from two dierent lot-
tery games played in the same region. The two games are of similar designs,
under similar operations and played by two populations that are considered
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to be similar in both race and culture. The only dierence between the
two games comes from the size of the prize-winning numbers in each draw.
In one game, single winning number is drawn whereas multiple (23) winning
numbers are drawn in the other. Through careful statistical analysis, the em-
pirical data validate that Gambler's Fallacy is observed in the lottery game
with a single winner; while Hot-Hand Fallacy arises in the one with more
complex, multiple outcomes.
Motivated by these observations, I propose in this paper a formal theory
to investigate the role of dierent game designs in \shaping" our perceptions
of randomness in the long run, by incorporating our innate desire to seek
patterns out of chaos.
I develop a Bayesian updating model to investigate conditions under
which pattern seeking leads to Hot-Hand Fallacy. In our setting, I suppose
a theory, such as a (possibly randomized) computer program, produces a
sequence of independent and identical outcomes. The agent has a prior belief
over a nite set of possible data-generating theories. The set in consideration
may or may not contain the true data-generating theory. The agent observes
realizations of random events in each period and relies on limited history to
update his/her beliefs.
One question to ask is whether the observed data provides enough infor-
mation to infer a \relatively small" set of plausible data-generating theories.
Unless one imposes some particular restrictions on conceivable theories, the
answer to this question is no. Recent research in statistics and economic the-
ory shows that there exists a set of theories that can be accepted as the true
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theory with arbitrarily high probability (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine (1999),
Lehrer (2001), Olszewski and Sandroni (2008), Sandroni et al. (2003), San-
droni (2003), Shmaya (2008)). This gives credence to the fact that people
might hold dierent beliefs to explain a sequence of random outcomes, which
may possibly conict with each other.
I show that as long as the agent considers the true theory as a possible
explanation, he/she will eventually make correct inferences as evidence accu-
mulates. What of more interests is whether there exist consistent predictions
about the agent's belief if his/her initial belief is biased, namely, the true
theory is not considered plausible1. In the model, I assume that there are
two distinct sets of theories. One set of theories predict higher chance for
the pattern outcomes (identied from past data) to occur; while the other
predict less. I show that the former theory prevails when the environment
is complex - when the ratio of pattern outcomes is relatively high compared
to the total number of possible outcomes (as in the multiple-number lottery
game).
Our results have important implications in problem gambling, risk man-
agement, and lab experiments where random outcomes are involved. They
indicate that the perception of randomness can be manipulated, and hence
behavior can be nudged with the appropriate design. For instance, several
countries have attempted to tamper with commuter's behavior by oering
incentive schemes for commuters to earn credit for each journey taken (triple
credit for o-peak journeys) to earn a chance of cash prizes in weekly lot-
1 Some punters in the lottery games subscribe to the conspiracy theory and believe that
winning numbers drawn are tweaked to favor the operators.
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teries. The success of these schemes hinges on the insights of behavioral
economics that the average person is risk seeking when the stake is small. So
a 1 in 1000 chance to win $100 is more attractive than a cash award of $0.10.
Our results say that we can do better, through designing the lottery games to
induce Hot-Hand Fallacy in the commuters, and oering them the chance to
choose their own \lucky" numbers to bet on. The belief (distortion) that the
winning probabilities of certain numbers are higher than theoretical average,
and the ability for the players to bet on these numbers, is enough to make
what is actually a 1 in 1000 chance of winning appears to be a much safer
bet, and thus more attractive to the players.
4.3 Literature Review
4.3.1 Uncertainty and pattern seeking
It has long been observed that in situations lacking control, people may tend
to believe that some mysterious, unseen mechanisms are secretly at work.
Numerous anecdotal evidence and research ndings circumstantially support
the assumption that more complex and uncertain situations lead to stronger
pattern seeking.
Fishermen who sh in the deep sea and whose lives are usually threat-
ened by the unpredictable weather and water conditions have much more
complicated superstitious beliefs than those who sh in the shallow water
(Malinowski [1948]). In March 2010, when the red shirt protests propagated
and economy receded, people in Thailand were reported to seek help from
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fortune tellers more frequently, probably to feel assured about the future.
Facing complex situation, it is a human instinct to look for patterns, as
illustrated by Proulx and Heine (2009). They made a group of subjects read
an absurd story by Kafka. To make it more complicated to comprehend,
they added to the story more inconsistent and bizarre illustrations, which
was meant to throw the subject in the world of complexity and chaos. While
another set of subjects read a more consistent version of the story. In the end,
when students played the game to nd patterns in strings of letters, students
who read the absurdist story were reported to nd much more patterns in
strings that those who read the consistent version. Those students tried to
combat the chaos presented by the absurd story, to nd the patterns in it,
and to make sense of it. This primed their brains to look harder for patterns
elsewhere, such as in strings of letters.
Whiteson and Galinsky (2008) study the relationship between lack of
control and illusory pattern seeking, rituals, and superstitions. They create
situations under which a group of subjects experience lack of control. They
nd that compared to the rest, those subjects see more false patterns in all
type of data, like imagining trends in stock markets, seeing faces in static
and develop superstitions etc.
In this paper, I make a natural assumption that people identify more
patterns from more complex historical results.
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4.3.2 Gambler's Fallacy and Hot-Hand Fallacy
Both Gambler's Fallacy and Hot-Hand Fallacy have long been observed in the
eld. Among many others, Clotfelter and Cook (1993) observe that lottery
players in 3D game in United States are subject to Gambler's Fallacy. Figure
4.2 shows the percentiles of betting ratios (betting volume index on particular
day over average index) on dierent days after the numbers are selected as
winners. Once a 3D number is drawn as the winner, the subsequent betting
volumes drop immediately and then gradually pick up. The immediate drop
after the winning number is drawn provides a strong evidence of Gambler's
Fallacy in the game. Meanwhile, Camerer (1989) show that betting markets
for basketball games exhibit a small Hot-Hand bias. Guryan and Kearney
(2008) examine the sales of lottery outlets selling winning jackpot tickets and
show that those stores experience signicant increase in game-specic ticket
sales, exhibiting the \lucky store" eect. Jorgensen et al (2011) examine a
set of panel data on lotto games and found that people usually avoid numbers
that have recently been drawn (exhibiting Gambler's Fallacy"); while they
tend to bet more on those winning numbers in streaks (that have been drawn
several time in a row), suggesting the existence of Hot-Hand Fallacy.
Gambler's Fallacy and Hot-Hand Fallacy may co-exist in the same agent
and appear within the same setting. One line of research posits that they
both arise from representativeness bias or belief in \the law of small num-
bers". Tversky and Kahneman (1971) coine this term and examine its con-
nection with Gambler's Fallacy. Rabin (2002) and Rabin and Vayanos (2010)
build theoretical models to model \the law of small numbers" which directly
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Fig. 4.2: Betting Ratios on Previous Winning Numbers in 3-Digit Numbers Game
(Clotfelter and Cook (1993)
leads to Gambler's Fallacy. These works identify the importance of the length
of streaks (sequence of repeated events) in inuencing the perception of ran-
domness, i.e., Gambler's Fallacy prevails in short streaks, but as the streaks
lengthen, beliefs in Hot-Hand dominate. Asparouhva et al. (2009) run a set
of lab experiments on binary choice game and the results support the work of
Rabin (2002). In recent work of Kendall (2010), the author uses a discount
factor to rene the model presented in Rabin (2002) and propose a simple
but eective model to explain the two fallacies.
Dierent from this line of research, our paper examine the role of game
designs in \shaping" the perception of randomness in a long run. I show
that due to pattern seeking, either Gambler's Fallacy or Hot-Hand Fallacy
can arise under appropriate conditions. I can actually manipulate the behav-
iors through careful system design. Besides, our paper generalizes the cur-
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rent conclusions on the streaks of binary outcomes. In our paper, \streaks"
becomes one particular pattern agents might recognize from previous out-
comes. When the streak short (i.e., the \streak" pattern has not been recog-
nized yet), people tend to believe in Gambler's Fallacy; while as the streak
lengthens and become an obvious pattern, Hot-Hand fallacy occurs. In the
single-winner lottery games, however, streaks are extremely unlikely, thus
Gambler's Fallacy is observed.
In spite of the excellent work on the \the law of small numbers" to
examine the two fallacies, another stream of research provides dierent ex-
planations. They argue that the nature of a random event generator, i.e.,
whether it is an inanimate device or a human being, determines the occur-
rence of Gambler's Fallacy or Hot-Hand Fallacy. (c.f. Ayton and Fisher
(2004), Burns and Corpus (2004)). If the random process is believed to be
generated by a machine, people will expect negative recency; while a positive
recency is expected if human beings generate the sequences. These results are
reinforced by eld observations made in casinos and lottery store(cf. Sundali
and Croson (2006) and Guryan and Kearney (2008)). In the recent work of
Caruso et al. (2010), through a set of lab experiments, they predict contin-
uation of a streak when subjects involved are considered to be intentional.
This work shares similar avor to our work in the way that an intentional
mind shows some mechanism is at work and patterns related to the intension
can be perceived.
According to their theory, Gambler's Fallacy would occur in lottery
games as the outcomes are generally believed to be generated without human
involvements. It, unfortunately, contradicts the eld observation I made. Our
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model explore this issue from the innate human nature of pattern seeking in
complex settings and establish conditions under which Gambler's Fallacy and
Hot-Hand Fallacy occur.
4.4 Field Evidence
In this section, I rst exhibit the empirical evidence to show that dierent
fallacy and decision biases may prevail under dierent gaming environments,
even if the games may appear to be similar in design. I collect rst-hand
data from two xed-odds lottery games to demonstrate this phenomenon.
The rst is a 3-Digit (3D) lottery game played in China, the scheme of which
resembles \pick 3" lottery game reported in Clotfelter and Cook (1993).
It draws a single prize-winning number each day, 7 times per week. The
other game, a 4-Digit (4D) lottery game played in South East Asia, draws 23
winning numbers instead, with 3 draws organized per week. The two number
games are of similar design, and played by two populations that are similar in
both race and culture. They dier mainly in the number of winning numbers
drawn. This provides a perfect test bed for the theory and predictions that
I will develop in section 4.5.
4.4.1 Gambler's Fallacy in 3D numbers game
In the 3D numbers game, a single winning number is randomly drawn from
000 to 999 with equal probability at 8:30pm each day. Lottery tickets on the
current draw are sold until 8:00pm. Every wager costs 2 local currency. The
payout structure and winning odds are shown in Table 4.1.
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Tab. 4.1: Prize Structure and Winning Odds in 3D Numbers Game
Bet Type Match to Win Payout per Wager Odd
Straight Match the exact order 1000 1 in 1000
Box 3 Match any order (2 identical digits) 320 1 in 333
Box 6 Match any order (3 unique digits) 160 1 in 167
A direct test of Gambler's Fallacy requires a full data set consisting of
the sales of each number in each draw. These data, however, are rarely made
available to the public. I collect regularly released data on the ocial web
site of the game operator2. The lottery company posts regularly on its web
site (i) the winning number drawn, (ii) number of winning wagers (of three
play types), and (iii) total sales in each draw. I collect the online data of
2272 draws over a 76-month period, from May 8, 2005 to September 15,
2011. From the data set, I construct a sub-sample of 95 draws that contains
winning numbers repeating within 7 weeks. In analyzing the data, I adopt a
similar methodology used in Terrell (1994).
With the information of winning wagers and payout structure, I can
easily calculate the payout of each winning numbers. To adjust for the day
of the week eect, I dene the payout rate R as the ratio of the payout
to total sales volume in a draw. R indicates the popularity of a winning
number. I want to nd out the impact on sales in subsequent draws after a 3D
number has been drawn as a winning number. Since I only have information
on winning numbers, I check the payout rates of those winning numbers
repeating within 7 weeks.
Table 4.2 shows the payout statistics (mean, standard deviation and
median) of winning numbers repeating within certain period. The overall
2 See http://www.zhcw.com/3d/kaijiangshuju/index.shtml?type=0.
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Tab. 4.2: Payout Statistic of Repeating Winning Numbers
Number Mean STD Median
winning numbers repeating within 1 week 12 0.436 0.52 0.259
winning numbers repeating between 1 and 2 weeks 12 0.358 0.15 0.346
winning numbers repeating between 2 and 4 weeks 25 0.384 0.22 0.303
winning numbers repeating between 4 and 7 weeks 46 0.475 0.23 0.418
Winner not repeating within 7 weeks 2177 0.503 0.31 0.430
Total 2272 0.500 0.31 0.427
mean payout rate is 0.5 and the median is 0.427. Table 4.2 indicates that
both the mean and the median of repeating winning numbers within 7 weeks
are lower than those statistics of all winning numbers. The median payout
of winning numbers that repeat within one week drops to around 40% and
then gradually picks up3. Two sample t-test shows that the mean of those
numbers repeating within 1 to 5 weeks is signicantly smaller than 0:5.
Let LogRi denote the logarithmic value of the payout rate of winning
number i. To analyze the eects of the winning number on sales, I build a
linear regression model using LogRi as the dependent variable. LetDi denote
the inverse of the number of draws it takes for a winning number i to show
up again as a winning number. A positive coecient of D indicates that
a winning draw promotes the popularity of a winning number (Hot-Hand
Fallacy) while a negative one undermines the popularity of a number (Gam-
bler's Fallacy). Besides, I dene the other independent variable LogLastRi.
It is the logarithmic value of the payout rate when the number i last won.
3 Note that such a tendency does not stand out in the mean statistic since the mean
of numbers repeating within one week is really high due to an outlier. 3D number 149
was drawn as the winner on Feb 13, 2008. One week later, when the same number 149
came out again as the winner, the payout ratio shoot 200:25%, the highest level recorded
in history. This noise explains the high mean and standard deviations among winner
repeating within one week
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Tab. 4.3: Results of Linear Regression on 3D Numbers Game
3D
Number of Observations 95
Constant   0:296
Delay  -.762
Previous Payout  :228
Adjusted R2 0.156
p < 0:01; p < 0:05; p < 0:1
A positive coecient of LogLastRi shows that the popularity of a number
persists. I specify the following estimation for a repeating winner i:
LogRi = + Di + LogLastRi + i: (4.1)
Among the parameters,  is a constant,  captures the eect of a winning
draw,  indicates the popularity of a number. Consistent with Table 4.2, I
only select winning numbers that repeat within 7 weeks. The regression
results are shown in Table 4.3. The coecient  is estimated to be  :762
and is signicantly negative at the 1% level. It indicates that the expected
payout value of a number drops by 17:3%(= 10 :762) one draw after it wins
the prize, keeping other variables constant. In all, if the payout rate of
a number is 0:5, the regression model predicts a mean payout of the same
number is 0.07 one draw after it wins, 0.362 ten draws after it wins and 0.395
twenty draws after it wins. Both the statistical data and regression results
suggest that Gambler's Fallacy exists among the players in the 3D lottery
game.
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Tab. 4.4: Prize Table and Winning Odds in 4D Numbers Game
Prize Category Payout per Wager Odds
1st Prize 2000 1 in 10000
2nd Prize 1000 1 in 10000
3rd Prize 500 1 in 10000
10 Starter 250 1 in 1000
10 Consolation 60 1 in 1000
4.4.2 Hot-Hand Fallacy in 4D numbers game
In the 4D lottery game, players bet on numbers selected from 0000 to 9999.
Sales for each draw start a week before and close at 6pm on the draw day.
Minimum cost of a bet is 1 local currency. 23 4D numbers are drawn as
winning numbers 3 times a week. The 23 winning numbers are generated
with replacement by rolling 4 boxes that contain 10 balls in each 4. There
are 5 prize categories. See in Table 4.4 the payout to each prize category and
winning odds.
I obtained data from a game operator in the South East Asia region, with
information on 156 draws that covers a one-year period. The dataset consists
of 23 winning numbers and sales volumes of each 4D number in each draw.
I want to investigate how a winning draw aects the sales of the winning
numbers in subsequent draws. To account for daily eects, I use betting
proportion as an indicator and it is dened as the ratio of the sales volume
of a 4D number to the total sales volume. I examine all winning numbers
from draw 1 to draw 100 and calculate their betting proportion respectively
on the day they are drawn, and subsequent 56 draws. About 40% increase
in sales immediately follows a winning draw, suggesting Hot-Hand Fallacy
4 This means that with slight chance there might be repetitions among the 23 winning
numbers.
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Tab. 4.5: Results of Linear Regression on 4D Numbers Game
Number of Observations 157
Constant   :452
Delay  0.114
Previous Payout  0:886
Adjusted R2 0.738
p < 0:01; p < 0:05; p < 0:1
prevail in the aggregate level.
Next, I run a regression model with the data in 4D numbers game. The
model is similar to the one dened in equation (4.1). Due to the presence
of dierent prize categories, I use the betting proportion instead of payout
ratio to indicate the popularity of a number 5. Again, let LogRi denote
the log value of betting proportion and LogLastRi the log value of betting
proportion when winner i last won. Similar to the analysis in the 3D game,
I use data that repeats within 7 weeks (21 draws). The regression results
are shown in Table 4.5 - contrary to the 3D game, the parameter in our
regression model is signicantly positive, which shows that winning in the
current draw has a positive impact on subsequent sales. These compelling
evidence suggests that players in 4D numbers game are subject to Hot-Hand
Fallacy.
I use the 4D sales data to validate further the basic assumption of this
paper: that the players recognize basic patterns from the winning numbers
appearing in the past draws. I say that a 4D number i is a \near miss" in
the current draw, if it is \similar" to a winning number, but not identical. I
specify two patterns of \near miss": Permutation, and Digit Replacement. If
5 Note that in the 3-D numbers game, the payout ratio is simply the betting proportion
times the prize.
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a player bets on a number that gets all the 4 digits right but in a wrong order,
a Permutation near miss occurs. On the other hand, if a number matches 3
digits of a winning number in the right position correctly, the bet is considered
a Digit-Replacement near miss. Both eld and lab research evidence indicate
that near miss can encourage more participation in lottery games (cf. Reid
(1986), Kassinove and Schare (2001)). These results are supported by Clark
et al. (2009) in their recent research in neuroscience. They also report that
game operators manipulate the frequency of near misses to generate more
sales. The near miss eect is a prime suspect to a fundamental psychological
factor leading to problem gambling.
In the following, I test whether there exists \near miss" eect in the
4D sales data. I draw insights using data from the 8th draw to the 146th
draw. I calculate the betting proportions of the near-miss numbers on the
day the corresponding winning numbers are drawn, 7 draws before these
numbers are drawn, and 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 7th and 14th draw after these number
are drawn. Table 4.6 lists the median value of the betting proportions of
the rst-prize winning numbers, 23 prize winning numbers, and near miss
numbers in specic draws. As illustrated in Table 4.6, both patterns of near
miss gain popularity after it hits a draw. This eect is more evident for rst
prize winning numbers, with surge of relative sales to about 102%. Hence
the hot hand fallacy on winning numbers spill over even to numbers that are
a "near miss", although the eect on sales is less signicant.
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Tab. 4.6: Lagged Average Betting Proportion of All Winning Numbers
Lag 23 winning numbers 1st Prize Winner Permutation Digit Replacement
-7 0.0838 0.0842 0.0991 0.099
0 0.0846 0.0848 0.0992 0.0992
1 0.1185 0.1712 0.1175 0.1068
2 0.1025 0.1434 0.1116 0.1049
3 0.0959 0.1272 0.1093 0.1041
7 0.0884 0.1135 0.1052 0.1021
14 0.0868 0.1075 0.1032 0.101
20 0.0852 0.096 0.1021 0.1004
4.5 The Model
In this section, I create a simple model in which a sequence of random out-
comes are generated and build a Bayesian updating model to investigate
under what conditions dierent game designs might lead to dierent biases
in the perception of randomness.
In each period t, suppose that a set of random outcomes Wt is produced
according to a stochastic data-generating process , under which the out-
comes are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.). Denote 
 as the
set that consists of all possible outcomes. Wt is a subset of 
. For example,

 contains all the possible values of returns of a mutual fund and Wt is the
realized return in period t. Alternatively, in a 4D lottery game, 
 consists of
all integers ranging from 0 to 9999 and Wt is a set that contains 23 integers
from 0 to 9999 - the 23 winning numbers drawn in period t.
Both current literature and anecdotal evidence demonstrate that agents
exhibit dierent kind of beliefs even when facing purely random outcomes. To
account for these dierences, I assume that an agent possesses beliefs taking
form of a nite collection of theories T . Each theory oers an explanation
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of the outcomes observed. Theories that attempt to explain the data can be
interpreted as probability distributions (Olszewski and Sandroni (2008)).
Denote by W the set of probability distributions over W and Ht =
fW1;W2;    ;Wtg the set of possible histories. A theory is formally dened as
a function  : [t0Ht 7! W .  denes a probability distribution of possible
outcomes in next period given the set of possible history Ht. I assume that
 satises the following conditions:
1.  is a stationary process,
2.  is a Markov processes of order r,
3.  gives positive probability to all nite-length histories of outcomes.
Condition 1 and 2 imply that theories are time-invariant and the agent
has such a limited memory that he only recalls the outcomes in the previous
r periods. Note that the third condition involves no loss of generality. Any
theory that assigns zero probability to certain possible outcomes would be
eventually discarded with probability one after sucient many periods.
The agent has a prior belief q0 over theories: q0 2 T . q0() gives a pri-
ori likelihood that  explains the output sequence. For the ease of exposition,
I assume that the agent starts to update his/her belief after observing the rst
r outcomes. For a given output sequence, let qt be the agent's posterior belief
after observing the rst t (t  r) outcomes. qt() = Pr( j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt).
I denote by (Wt+1 j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt) the likelihood of getting an outcome
Wt+1 given the previous sets of outcomes Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt under theory  :
(Wt+1 j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt) = Pr(Wt+1 j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt; ):
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Assume the agent is perfectly Bayesian. Then the posteriors are computed
according to Bayes' rule:
qt+1() = qt()  (Wt+1 j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt)P
^2T qt(^)  ^(Wt+1 j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt)
: (4.2)
qt() can be interpreted as the weight assigned to theory  after observing
the rst t outcomes.
One question to ask is to which extent dierent theories explain a se-
quence of outcomes. By condition (3), I know that no theory refutes a nite
sequence of outcomes. Two probability distributions P and Q are said to
be orthogonal whenever there exists an event E such that E occurs almost
surely under P and almost never under Q. The following lemma demon-
strates that two distinct (orthogonal) theories satisfying conditions (1){(3)
provide explanations for disjoint collections of output sequences.
Lemma 2. Any two distinct processes 1 and 2 that satisfy conditions (1){(3)
are such that, for all periods t and nite historiesW1; : : : ;Wt, the conditional
distributions 1( j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt) and 2( j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt) are orthogonal.
Proof.
See Appendix II.
Exploiting the result in Lemma 1, I show in the following proposition
that the outcomes will eventually be interpreted by the truth data-generating
process  , as long as the agent considers  as a possible theory, i.e.,  2 T .
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Proposition 8. For every sequence of outcomes W1;W2; : : : generated by ,
as long as  2 T , the posterior weight that the agent assigns to the true
data-generating process converges towards one, i.e., limt!+1 qt() = 1.
Proof. See Appendix II.
Proposition 1 states that when the agent is perfectly Bayesian and the
true theory is considered possible, he/she will eventually learn the truth
for almost all sequences. I stress that this fact is true regardless of the
prior belief of the agent, as long as the agent assigns a positive weight, even
light, to the true data generating process. Concretely, the result means
that, even if an agent starts with a strong bias towards alternative theories,
the bias eventually self-corrects through Bayesian revision as observations
accumulate.
What will happen if the agent's prior belief does not assign any weight
to the truth, i.e.,  =2 T ? Will the agent's belief converge, and if so, which
biased belief will it converge to? In what follows, I incorporate \pattern
seeking" in our model and explore the conditions under which Gambler's
Fallacy or Hot-Hand Fallacy prevails.
Human subjects tend to seek certain types of patterns among elements
in and between the (possibly random) outcomes. These patterns capture the
idea that one element is intuitively related to another. In basketball game,
agents readily believe that a series of shots taken by the same player are re-
lated, even though complex analysis show they are statistically independent
of each other. To capture this notion of relationship, I use a relationship func-
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tion  to model such patterns. In particular,   (Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt) records
a set of possible outcomes that manifest the patterns an agent might rec-
ognize from the previous outcomes Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt. These outcomes will be
accorded special attention and treated dierently from the outcomes outside
of the set.
Let  be the set of all relationship functions assumed plausible. I call
(Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt) the \pattern set". It should be noted that the patterns
recognized from a set of outcomes are generally subjective, and I do not
attempt to explicitly describe the elements in . Intuitively, the larger the
set of outcomes, the more likely a recognized pattern is reinforced by new
\evidence". Due to limited attention of the agents,  is kept reasonably
small. As I show below, it is precisely the quantity of available patterns{or
to be exact, their probability mass{that eventually determines whether an
agent becomes subject to the Hot-Hand or Gambler's Fallacy in the long run.
Dene an indicator
R(Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt+1)  fWt+1
\
(Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt) 6= ;g:
R(Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt+1) = 1 if the outcome in period t + 1 and the previous r
outcomes are related. Since the outcomes Wi's in each period are indepen-
dently and identically generated by , the indicator R(Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt+1) is
independent of t.
To illustrate how the size of the outcomes aects the pattern set and
E(R(Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt+1)), suppose I randomly generate n 3-digit integers
ranging from 0 and 999 in each period. In each round, the agent observes
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n outcomes and forms a pattern set. For sake of simplicity, assume the
agent has a memory of only one period, i.e., r = 1. Suppose the relation-
ship function contains \identity", \permutation", and \one-digit replace-
ment" functions. The \identity" function assigns the same n outcomes to
the pattern set . The \one-digit replacement" function keeps two digits
of each of the 3-Digit outcomes and replaces the last with a dierent digit
chosen from 0 to 9. For example, this function assign an outcome 123 to
f023; 223; 323; 423; 523; 623; 723; 823; 923; 103; 113; 133; 143; 153; 163; 173; 183; 193; 120; 121;
122; 124; 125; 126; 127; 128; 129g. The \permutation" function assigns the
outcome 123 to f132; 213; 231; 312; 321g. As n increase, the size of the pat-
tern set constructed using the above relationship functions will also increase,
and hence the probability of observing an outcome intersecting the pattern
set in the next period will increase. Figure 4.3 demonstrates the numerical
results on the size of the pattern sets and the value E(R(Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt+1))
under dierent n. Obviously, as the size of the outcomes n increase, the size
of the pattern set increase, so does the probability that two sets are related.
In the following, I assume that the agents do not assign any weight to
the true theory . Without loss of generality, I divide the theories into two
classes. The rst class of theories T1 \promote" related outcomes. A theory
1 in the rst class predicts a relatively high probability for outcomes in the
next period that is deemed to be related to those in the previous periods.
Theory 1 is specied by a parameter 1, 1 > 1. The value 1 indicates the
probability ratio of the related outcome to the unrelated one. With a slight
abuse of notation, I dene R(t+1; r)  fWt+1 : Wt+1
T
(Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt) 6=
; j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wtg. R(t+ 1; r) happens with  probability x(t+ 1; r). For
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Fig. 4.3: Expected size of the pattern sets and estimated E(R(Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt+1))
(denoted by x) under dierent n
t = r + 1; r + 2; : : : ;
1(Wt+1 j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt) =
8>><>>:
1(Wt+1)




In contrast, the second class of theories T2 \undermine" related out-
comes. A theory 2 in this class predicts that patterns are less likely than
under the true data generating process. This class contains theories that
lead to Gambler's Fallacy. Similarly, 2 is characterized by a parameter 2,
0 < 2 < 1. For t = r; r + 1; : : : ;
2(Wt+1 j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt) =
8>><>>:
2(Wt+1)
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The set of plausible theories is then dened as T = T1 [ T2.
Further, two regularity assumptions on parameters 1; 2 are made.
Assumption 1. 0 < 1 + 2   2 < 2(1   1)(1  2).
Assumption 2. log 1
2
< 1   2 and log 12 < 1 212 .
The implications of Assumption 1 are two folds. The left-hand sided
inequality guarantees that the sum of 1 and 2 is not too small. A smaller
1 indicates that theory 1 is closer to the true theory; while a smaller 2
implies that theory 2 is more distinct from the true theory. If this constraint
is violated, theory 1 dominates in the long run. On the other hand, the sec-
ond constraint regulate the two parameters to ensure 2 does not dominate.
Assumption 2 requires that 1 is big enough while 2 is small enough. This
assumption makes sure that both theories are suciently dierent from the
true theory to make the results more meaningful.
Dene a function f(x) = x log 1
2
+ log 1+(2 1)x
1+(1 1)x . Assumption 1 and 2
lead to the following lemma.
Lemma 3. When Assumption 1 and 2 hold, a unique solution x(0 < x < 1)
exists that solves f(x) = 0. Besides, f(x) < 0 when x 2 (0; x) and f(x) > 0
when x 2 (x; 1).
Proof. See Appendix II.
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Figure 4.4 depicts function f(x) given that 1 = 5, 2 = 0:2. The cut-o
probability is around 0:5. As we can see, f(x) > 0 when x > 0:5 while f(x)
is below zero when x < 0:5.












Gambler’s Fallacy Hot−Hand Fallacy
α1=5, α2=0.2
x*
Fig. 4.4: One illustration of Proposition 2
For simplicity, I assume that the agent considers only 1 and 2 plausi-
ble. His prior belief assigns positive weights to both theories, i.e., q0(1) >
0; q0(2) > 0; q0(1) + q0(2) = 1. The agent starts updating his/her be-
liefs after observing r outcomes according to the Bayes' Rule and qr(1) =
q0(1); qr(2) = q0(2). The posterior belief period t+ 1 is:
qt+1(1) =
qt(1)  1(Wt+1 j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt)P
i=1;2 qt(i)  i(Wt+1 j Wt r+1; : : : :Wt)
(4.5)
Which biased belief would the Bayesian updating process converge to?
The following proposition states sucient conditions under which the Bayesian
updating converges to the theory corresponding to Hot-Hand Fallacy or Gam-
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bler's Fallacy. Recall that x(t+ 1; r) is the probability that the outcomes in
period t+ 1 and the previous outcomes are related. Dene a critical value
 =
 E [f(x(t+ 1; r)) j x(t+ 1; r) < x]
E [f(x(t+ 1; r)) j x(t+ 1; r)  x]  E [f(x(t+ 1; r)) j x(t+ 1; r) < x]
Proposition 9. Suppose that the theory set T contain 1 and 2. For every se-
quence of  almost outcomes W1;W2; : : : , the following convergence results
hold:
1) The agent's belief converges to 1, i.e., limt!+1 qt(1) = 1 a.e. as long
as (x(t+ 1; r)  x) > ; 8 t  r;
2) The agent's belief converges to 2 when (x(t+1; r)  x) < ; 8 t  r.
Proof. See Appendix II.
Which belief will the updating process converge to if 1 and 2 change?
Figure 4.5 plots the relationships between the cut-o probability x and
12. I can see that as 12 increases, the cut-o probability x becomes
larger. Larger x suggests that the conditions in result 2) of Proposition 2 is
easier to achieve, i.e., agent' belief will more likely to converge to Gambler's
Fallacy. This is because a bigger 1  2 indicates that 1 promotes related
outcomes with a higher ratio than 2 promotes unrelated ones, which means
2 is closer to the true theory. Therefore, the agent's belief is more likely to
converge to 2, which corresponds Gambler's Fallacy.
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In conclusion, bigger 12 results in larger x, and Gambler's Fallacy
is more likely to occur in the long run. On the other hand, Hot-Hand Fallacy
dominates when 1  2 is small.





























Fig. 4.5: The Cut-o Proportions as a function of 1  2
I simulate the following scenarios and test the implications of the theory
developed. In the simulation,
1. N balls are in a urn and are numbered from 0 to N   1;
2. In each period, n balls are drawn independently from the urn. The
drawing process is with replacement, i.e., after a ball is drawn and its
number taken down, it is put back to the urn and then another ball is
drawn;
3. n N ;
4. Agents have a limited memory of only one period;
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5. \Equality", \Permutation" and \One-digit Replacement" are the pos-
sible relationships an agent identies among the numbers in two sets
of outcomes.
Note that I assume that the winning numbers in the same period are drawn
with replacement, which means the same number may be drawn as a win-
ning number more than once. This case rarely happens though, under the
assumption that n << N .
I dene the set of outcomes in period t asWt = f!1t; !2t; : : : ; !ntg, where
!jt; j = 1; : : : ; n denotes a winning number drawn in period t. Since each
number is randomly and independently drawn with replacement, Pr(!j;t) =




Denote (Wt) as the set of numbers that are related to Wt and mt =j
(Wt) j the size of the set. An agent believes in two possible theories 1 and
2. In particular, 1 and 2 are dened by:
1(!j;t+1 j Wt) =
 1
N+(1 1)mt if !j;t+1 2 (Wt)
1
N+(1 1)mt if !j;t+1 =2 (Wt)
: (4.6)
2(!j;t+1 j Wt) =
 2
N+(2 1)mt if !j;t+1 2 (Wt)
1
N+(2 1)mt if !j;t+1 =2 (Wt)
; (4.7)
Assume that in the rst period when no history is observed, 1(!j; 1) =
2(!j; 1) = 1=N .
In the following, I run a set of matlab experiments under a set of parame-
ters (N; n; 1; 2) to gain a glimpse of the relationships between the direction
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of convergence and the value of the parameters. I rst x N = 1000; 1 = 5
and 2 = 0:2, and change n from 1 to 100. Consistent with the prediction of
the model, the experimental results show that as n increases, the process is
more likely to converge to the theory that corresponds to Hot-Hand Fallacy.
Figure 4.6 demonstrates two typical updating processes for qt(1) under dif-
ferent size of winning numbers. In this case, note that x =  = 0:5. When
n = 1, the number of outcomes in the pattern set, at time t, is at most 336.
Hence x(t + 1; r) < 33=1000 irrespective of the outcome drawn in period t.
Thus (x(t+ 1; r) > 0:5) = 0 and hence our result indicates that Gambler's
Fallacy will dominate. On the other hand, when n increases to 23, the num-
ber of outcomes in the pattern set increases drastically, and could be as high
as 33  23 = 759. It is easy to check that (x(t + 1; r) > 0:5) > 0:5 in this
case and hence Hot-Hand Fallacy dominates.




























Fig. 4.6: The updating process of q1(1) Given N = 1000 and n = 3; 23.
6 1 from the identity relation, at most 5 more from the permutation relation, and at
most 27 more from the single digit replacement function.
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4.6 Conclusion and Discussions
This paper studies how the innate human nature to seek pattern out of chaos
leads to biased perceptions of randomness. I develop a Bayesian updating
model to examine how beliefs evolve through time. Our model predicts that
when the set of outcomes are relatively large for agents to infer sucient
patterns, the Hot-Hand beliefs may dominate. The theoretical results are re-
inforced by two datasets collected from two dierent lottery games played in
the region. One lottery game with single winning number per draw exhibits
Gambler's Fallacy among players, while the other with multiple winning num-
bers shows Hot-Hand Fallacy. Field data show that once people recognize
enough patterns among the outcomes, they tend to believe that the same
outcome or related outcomes will repeat in the future. This conrms the
prediction from the Bayesian updating model.
The notion that human can be manipulated to believe in the hot hand
fallacy, through appropriate game design, has important ramications in var-
ious elds. First, it provides a behavioral explanation to the \medium prizes
puzzle" (cf. Haruvy et al (2001)) - why did lottery game operators typically
oer prize distribution of a few large prizes and a large number of medium
one? This is puzzling especially if we assume gamblers are typically risk
seeking. There are two common explanations for this puzzling observation.
One is through the lens of prospect theory - a large number of medium prizes
reduces the probability of losing from near certainty to some smaller proba-
bility. Another explanation follows the line of adaptive learning - that human
behavior is best captured by simple adaptive learning models, and actions
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that did better in the past will tend to be adopted more frequently compared
to actions that did worse. Thus the presence of medium prizes slows down
the punter's inclination to gamble less. Both explanations, however, failed to
account for the decision biases in the Gambler's and Hot-Hand fallacies. It
could not explain, for instance, why players in these games normally prefer to
choose their own numbers to bet on. Our theory of pattern seeking provides
another explanation - that a large number of medium prizes can induce more
players to believe in Hot-Hand Fallacy (that a selected set of numbers have
a larger than the true probability of winning the lottery). This reduces the
inclination of the players to quit the game and also to bet on those numbers
they believe to have a larger probability of winning.
Second, it provides guidelines in designing lottery games to induce de-
sirable behavior. There is a recent trend for governments to encourage good
civic behavior through the use of lottery games. Richard Thaler expounds
recently on the merits of this approach 7. New Taipei City in Taiwan re-
cently initiats a lottery as an inducement for dog owners (and other citizens)
to clean up after their pets, in order to win gold ingots worth as much as
$2000. The Singapore government is also experimenting with a new incentive
scheme for commuters to earn credit for each journey taken (triple credit for
o-peak journeys) for a chance to win cash prizes in weekly lotteries. Our
study highlights several features for these lottery games to be more eective
in inuencing behavior - that there should be a suciently large number of
medium prizes (to induce more hot hand believers), and also to nd a mech-
7 See the article \Making Good Citizenship Fun" on New York Times, February 13th,
2012
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anism to allow the players to bet on numbers they believe to have a higher
probability of winning (thus increasing their incentive to participate in the
lottery games through good civic behavior). One way to do this is to use
personalized numbers (instead of random numbers) that the players can eas-
ily relate to draw for the winners. The Dutch government uses this principle
very eectively - one of its state lotteries is based on postal codes. The idea
is to play on people's feelings of regret, and also to exploit the \lucky store"
eect that has been shown to exist in various lottery games - your chances
of winning will be higher if your postal code has been drawn before (or near
miss) in the previous draws!
Our results also shed light on a question raised in Guryan and Kear-
ney (2008): why lottery players believe that lightning will strike twice in
the case of lottery vendors, but not in the case of numbers? Guryan and
Kearney (2008) have documented a sharp increase in sales for stores that
have sold a winning lottery ticket in the Lotto Texas game, whereas Clot-
felter and Cook (1993) have documented that sales in a pick-3 game falls
sharply after the number is drawn. One speculative explanation oered by
Guryan and Kearney (2008) is along the line of animate/inanimate versus
intended/non-intended distinction - the winning number is drawn from a me-
chanical device, but the location of the winning outlet is chosen deliberately
by the person buying the winning ticket. Another possible explanation can
be oered along the line of pattern set introduced in this paper - there were
669 retail outlets in Texas, and 68 winning jackpots over 2.5 year period of
the study. Furthermore, the data indicates that lucky store eect can linger
for as long as 40 over weeks after a store sold the winning ticket. This means
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that the impression of a store selling a winning ticket has a long memory,
and thus a richer pattern set. This is enough to induce some players in the
game to believe in the hot-hand phenomenon, leading to an increase in sales
for the lucky store. This theory also partially explains why the lucky store
eect is less pronounced in other lottery games played in Texas, such as the
Cash 5 and Texas Two-Step games. The jackpot sizes of these games are
much smaller, and winning the jackpot is less sensational. The memory of
the winners is shorter, and thus the pattern set is more sparse.
5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS
The objective of this dissertation has been to investigate three phases in a
typical fact-based decision making process. The three phases include data
collecting, pattern seeking, and performance improvement. The dissertation
is motivated by several industrial data sets. It explores (behavioral) pat-
terns in the pertinent system, then incorporates these patterns into service
system design. As a close loop, this dissertation have gone one step further
to investigate how system design aects behavioral patterns, in particular,
customers' biased perceptions of randomness. This dissertation focuses on
two areas: health-care management and behavioral economics.
The dissertation consists of three topics, which examine the following
three research questions: 1) Are there simple and universal patterns when
people make choices? 2) How to utilize limited (insucient) data to de-
sign a robust service system to ensure good performance under all possible
situations? 3) How system design aects behavioral patterns?
The rst topic titled \Benford's Law and Number Selection in Fixed-
Odds Numbers Game" investigates a universal pattern revealed when people
make random choices: the small number phenomenon. There are ample
empirical evidence suggesting that players do not choose all numbers with
equal probability, but have a tendency to bet on (small) numbers that are
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closely related to events around them (e.g., birth dates, addresses, etc.). To
the best of my knowledge, this topic is the rst to quantify this phenomenon
and examine its relation to the classical Benford's law. I use this connection
to develop a choice model that incorporates this universal phenomenon. In
xed-odds numbers games, the prizes and the odds of winning are known at
the time of placement of the wager. Both players and operators are subject to
the vagaries of luck in such games. Most game operators limit their liability
exposure by imposing a sales limit on the bets received for each bet type,
at the risk of losing the rejected bets to the underground operators. I argue
that the choice of the sales limit is intimately related to the ways players
select numbers to bet on in the games. I exploit the choice model we built
to optimally decide appropriate sales limit to control the risk for the game
operator.
The second topic entitled \Appointment System Design using Copositive
Cones" concerns the design of appointment systems to regulate the usage of
precious resources in a service system. In particular, I investigate a stochas-
tic appointment scheduling and sequencing problem in an outpatient clinic
with a single doctor. The number of patients is xed, and the problem is
to determine the arrival time and order for each customer. I have collected
data on the service durations of 1021 patients in an local eye clinic. In the
model, I assume that the service durations of the patients are stochastic,
and only the mean and covariance estimates are known. I do not assume
any exact distributional form of the service durations, and solve for distri-
butionally robust schedules that minimize the expectation of the weighted
sum of patients' waiting time and doctor's overtime. The scheduling prob-
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lem is formulated as a convex conic optimization problem with a tractable
semi-denite (SDP) relaxation. Using the primal-dual optimality conditions,
I prove several interesting structural properties of optimal schedules. Despite
the required relaxation in computation, I can still obtain near optimal solu-
tions compared to the existing literature. I apply this method in a realistic
setting at an eye clinic and suggest new schedules that can improve the e-
ciency of the clinic by around 35%. Further, this approach can be extended
to solve the appointment and sequencing problem can be simultaneously,
which can be approximated by a 0-1 SDP problem.
In the third topic I focus on a close-loop of the fact-based decision making
process and investigate how system design in turn aects people's behaviorial
patterns. Facing a sequence of random outcomes, people may erroneously
impose positive or negative correlations on independent outcomes. The Hot-
Hand Fallacy (belief in positive recency) and the Gambler's Fallacy (belief in
negative recency) are two most common biases in the perceptions of random-
ness. I shows that game designs might shape biased perception of randomness
due to one embedded human nature, pattern seeking. I develop an economic
setting in which a sequence of random outcomes are generated and build a
Bayesian Updating model to explore conditions under which the Hot-hand
Fallacy or Gambler's Fallacy appears. Our model implies that the more com-
plex the information set (historical outcomes), where pattern-seeking has its
stronger appeal, the more likely that an agent converges to beliefs giving rise
to the Hot-Hand Fallacy. I collect two sets of eld data from gaming industry
to provide a solid foundation and verication of the insights gained from the
model. These results have important implications in problem gambling, risk
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management, and lab experiments where random outcomes are involved.
In summary, the three topics, viewing the issues in fact-based decision
making through multiple methodologies, have contributed to the discipline of
Business Analytics. In addition to the contributions that have already been
highlighted in each topic, this dissertation brings out important perspec-
tives for future BA research. First, the dissertation exhibits the eectiveness
of combining multiple research methodologies in investigating an integrated
fact-based decision making process. These methodologies include empirical
study, experimental research, optimization, and simulation. A planned future
research approached in dierent ways will certainly bring out fresh insights
in both theory and practice. Second, this dissertation highlights an impera-
tive role of incorporating human behaviors into system design. Continuous
improvement in BA requires investigating the interface between behavioral
economics and service science. It is crucial to examines human behavioral
patterns before trying to improve the service system. Besides, while human
behaviors may aect the system performance, the system may cultivate cer-
tain behavioral patterns in the system. Only taking this recursive eect into
consideration could continuous improvement be made possible.
Future research can continue exploiting the framework built in this dis-
sertation. For example, with individual-level data on price-plan choice and
consumption, I can study patterns in customer choice when a bundle of
products are oered using empirical and experimental approach. Next, per-
formance improvement can be reached through exploring the corresponding
pricing strategy of a company utilizing the optimization and simulation tools.
This dissertation, although a preliminary exploration in BA research, is a sig-
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nicant step in laying the foundations of the framework and providing a road
map for future research in this area.
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6. APPENDICES
6.1 Appendix I: Proofs in Topic 2
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Recall equation (3), the waiting time of the ith patient in the
appointment system is given by
wi = max
(






In the optimal network ow solution, the unit supply from node i will nd a
path to destination s, by maximizing the ow cost among the paths:
(i! s); (i! i  1! s); : : : ; (i! i  1! : : : 1! s):
Hence the ow cost attained by the supply from node i is just wi.
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Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. The proof consists of two parts. In the rst part, I show that
problem (C) provides an upper bound to problem (P), i.e. Z 0P (s)  ZP (s),
8s. Next, through a constructive approach, I nd a sequence of random
variables, ~u that satises the moment conditions in the limiting sense and
E [f (s; ~u)] converges to Z
0
P (s) when  converges to zero, i.e., the bound
provided by (C) is tight.
Step 1. Z 0P (s)  ZP (s), 8s.
For any random variable ~x in R+, it is well-known that there exists a
sequence of simple random variables that increasingly converges to ~x in every
sample point. Hence, for any valid distribution of the service durations, ~u, I
can nd a sequence of discrete random vectors that increasingly converge to






. Obviously, f (s; ~u) is continuous and increasing in ~u, so for any
schedule s,
~uk (!) " ~u (!) ; 8! 2 
 =) f  s; ~uk (!) " f (s; ~u) (!) ; 8! 2 
;
where 










= E [f (s; ~u)] :







attainable by (C) for every k, E [f (s; ~u)] is attainable by (C), too. Hence
for any appointment schedule and any service time distribution, Z 0P (s) 
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E [f (s; ~u)]. Therefore, Z 0P (s)  ZP (s), 8s.
Step 2. Z 0P (s)  ZP (s), 8s.




































where K+ and K0 are nite. For  2 (0; 1), I dene a sequence of random
















= 2 1jK0j ; 8k 2 K0




(1  2)(k)2 + P
k2K0








= (1  2) + 2
= 1
Moreover, ~u is a valid service time distribution in the limiting sense, i.e.,
the moment conditions for the service time distribution are satised by ~u
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when  # 0,


































































= (k)2; 8k 2 K+:
From the Continuous Mapping Theorem,
~u ! ~u a: s: =) f(s; ~u)! f(s; ~u) a: s:
Furthermore, since the feasible space for f(s; ~u) is bounded, i.e., every fea-
sible solution y(~u)  Ke, for some 0 < K <1, where e is a vector of ones.
1 Rigorously speaking, the convergenc of ~u to ~u
 is a weak convergence, i.e., conver-
gence in distribution. However, since it is up to our construction on ~u and ~u
, from
Skorohod's Theorem, I can construct them in the same probability space with the same
probability measure and ~u converges to ~u
 almost surely.
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The niteness of the second moment implies that the sequence f(s; ~u) is
uniformly integrable. Therefore, I have
lim
#0
E [f(s; ~u)] = E [f(s; ~u
)] :
For any schedule s, dene the space of all feasible rst and second mo-





1; ^; ^; f^






It can be easily veried that K(s) is a convex cone. Then the closure of K(s)
(denoted as K(s)) would be a closed convex cone. For every  2 (0; 1), I have
 






















(1;;;E [f(s; ~u)]) 2 K(s):
Since the point (1;;; ZP (s)) lies on the boundary of this closed convex
cone, I have ZP (s)  E [f(s; ~u)]. Thus,












= Y (s)  Z
= Z 0P (s)
Therefore, I have completed the proof.
Remark 6. It is clear from the above proof that decomposition (3.5) does
not give the exact worst case distribution, but merely provides us a way to
construct a sequence of distributions that satises the moment conditions
and approximates the objective value ZP (s) in the limiting sense. In fact, I
do not have an explicit characterization of the worst case distribution.
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Appendix C. An Example on Strong Conic Duality
Consider a simple two dimensional problem as follows for any Y 2 R22 and
b 2 R:
ZP := max Y  Z












:   0; v  0; v = b
9>=>; :
Clearly, D is not fully dimensional, since dim(D) = 1: In this case,











On the other hand, the dual cone of D is
D =






and the dual optimum
ZD := min
8><>: : W =
0B@  0
0 0
1CA  Y 2 D
9>=>; = Y 
0B@ 1 b
b b2
1CA = ZP :
Appendix D. Proofs of the Propositions in Section 3.6
Before presenting the proofs, I rst dene the necessary dual variables of (S).
Let Z be the dual variables of the copositivity constraint. Note that Z is
exactly the conic variable in (C), i.e., Z 2 D. Denote
8><>: Z1;n+1+i = y^i; i = 1; 2; : : : ; nZ1;2n+1+i = z^i+1; i = 1; 2; : : : ; n
Then from the probabilistic interpretation on the decomposition of Z shown
in (3.5), I have
8><>: y^i = E [yi (s; ~u)] ; i = 1; 2; : : : ; nz^i+1 = E [zi+1 (s; ~u)] ; i = 1; 2; : : : ; n
where (y(s; ~u); z(s; ~u)) is the optimal solution to f (s; ~u) under the worst
case distribution of ~u. Dene the dual variables of the constraints in (3.8)
by  and i, where  corresponds to the total session time limit constraint,
whereas i corresponds to the non-negativity constraint for si.
The proofs are based on the KKT conditions and the network structure
shown in Figure 3.2. I have shown that the Slater's constraints qualica-
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tion is satised, so the KKT conditions are both necessary and sucient in
characterizing the optimal solutions.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Assume in the optimal solution, si = 0 and s

i+1 > 0 for some
i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; n   1g. Then the cost on arc (i + 1; i) in the network is ~ci =
~ui   si = ~ui  0. Due to the nature of maximal cost ow problem, any ow
entering node i + 1 will choose arc (i + 1; i) instead of arc (i; s) whose cost
is zero in any situations. Then I have zi+1(~u) = 0 for any realization of ~u,
and consequently E[zi+1] = 0, i.e., in the optimal solution to problem (S),
z^i+1 = 0.
Recall that i is the cost of the waiting time of the i
th patient in the






















=) i+1 = 0
=) y^i+1 =    i+1 = 
=) y^i = i+1 + y^i+1   z^i+1 = i+1 + :
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Since y^i = 
   i ; I have
i+1 + 
 =    i
=) i =  i+1 < 0;
which contradicts i  0. Hence, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. By a similar proof as in Proposition 3, all the negative time slots
should be scheduled at the end of the session. Hence, I only need to prove
that there is only one such slot, which is sn+1.
Assume in an optimal schedule, denoted by s(1), there are at least two
nonpositive time slots, i.e., s
(1)
n 1 < 0 and s
(1)
n < 0. Consider a new schedule,
















Let TC(1)(~u) and TC(2)(~u) be the total waiting time cost for the sched-





n 1  0, and ~u(k)n   s(k)n  0, k = 1; 2. Then considering the input of the
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last two nodes, i.e., n entering node n and n+1 entering node n+ 1, I get
TC(1)(~u)  TC(2)(~u) = n(~un 1   s(1)n 1) + n+1(~un   s(1)n + ~un 1   s(1)n 1)




Thus, s(1) should never be optimal, and I reach a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. The proof only makes use of part of the KKT conditions, i.e.,
8>>>><>>>>:
 y^i +    i = 0; 8i = 1; 2; : : : ; n
i s

i = 0; 8i = 1; 2; : : : ; n
  0
(6.1)
When si > 0; 8i 2 I  f1; 2; : : : ; ng, from the second set of constraints
in equation (6.1), I get
i = 0; 8i 2 I  f1; 2; : : : ; ng:
Hence,
y^i = 




; ~u)] =   0; 8i 2 I  f1; 2; : : : ; ng:
Dening the constant K :=   0, I get the desired result.
Appendix E: Proof to Theorem 3
Assume that there are n patients to be scheduled. For each patient Jj; j =
1; 2;    ; n, let pj denote the allocated appointment interval and qj the cor-
responding actual consultation time.
Let P = fp1; p2;    ; png and Q = fq1; q2;    ; qng. For any given se-
quence  and P , let Cj(P ; ) denote the scheduled completion time for patient
Jj. Therefore, the appointment time given to patient Jj under  is:
aj(P ; ) = Cj(P ; )  pj: (6.2)
Let Cj(P ;Q; ) denote the actual completion time for patient Jj. The
waiting time for this patient is
wj = Cj(P ;Q; ) qj aj(P ; ) = (Cj(P ;Q; ) qj) (Cj(P ; ) pj): (6.3)
The objective of the appointment sequencing problem now is to nd a se-
quence  such that the total patient's waiting time
Pn
j=1Wj is minimized. In-
terestingly, this problem is related to the following well-known NP-complete
problem (cf. Gary & Johnson (1979)).
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Numerical 3-Dimensional Matching (N3DM)
Instance: Given three disjoint sets W;X; Y , each containing m elements, a
size s(a) 2 Z+ for each element a 2 W [X [ Y , and a bound B 2 Z+.
Question: CanW[X[Y be partitioned intom disjoint sets A1; A2;    ; Am
such that each Ai contains exactly one element from each ofW;X and Y and
such that, for i = 1; 2;    ;m, Pa2Ai s(a) = B?
Proof. I show that given an instance of N3DM, I can construct an instance
of the appointment scheduling problem as follows. Suppose there are 3m+1
jobs such that pj = 5M for j = 1; 2;    ; 3m+ 1; and
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
qi = 6M + s(i) if i 2 W
qj = 4M + s(j) if j 2 X




where M is a number much larger than B,e,g., M > m2B. The question is:
can I nd a sequence  to the appointment scheduling problem such that,
3m+1X
j=1







For notational convenience, I call jobs corresponding to setW;X; Y ,W -type,
X-type and Y -type respectively. To start with, suppose that the N3DM prob-
lem has a feasible solution. I then can obtain a sequence containing the fol-
lowingm+1 consecutive blocks, where the jobs in Block i, i = 1;    ;m;m+1
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correspond to a 2 Ai, and within each Ai jobs are sequenced in W;X; Y or-
der. The m + 1th block contains only J3m+1. By denition, in the above
sequence, Cj(P ; ) = 5jM for j = 1; 2;    ; 3m + 1. Also, in the actual
processing, there is no idle time for the machine. In each block, the waiting
time is zero for the W -type job, M + s(i) for X-type job and s(i) + s(j)
for Y -type job, where s(i) corresponds to the W -type job processed in the
rst position and s(j) corresponds to the X-type job processed in the second









Then, suppose that there exists a sequence  to the appointment schedul-
ing problem such that
P3m+1





I rst claim that in such a sequence, J3m+1 must be processed in the last
position. Otherwise, after J3m+1 there are still other patients left and the
waiting time is at least m2M , which is larger than Z. This is a contradiction
to our assumption. Note that the waiting time of any patient that is sched-
uled immediately after a W -type patient is at least M + s(i). Therefore,
the total waiting time for those patient is at least mM +
P
i2X s(i). Now
I show that X-type patient must be scheduled immediately after a W -type
patient. If not, what follows W -type patient must be W -type or Y -type
patient. Firstly, if it is W -type patient who is scheduled immediately after,
then the total waiting time should be at least (m+ 1)M +
P
i2X s(i), which
is bigger than Z. Otherwise, if Y -type patient would be put immediately
after W -type patient, then total waiting time for all patients should be at
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least (m+1)M B, which is also bigger than Z and a contradiction. In such
a case, in each block, the sequence is W -type, X-type, Y -type and the total




j2X s(j) = Z: In
the actual processing, there will not be any idle time for the machine. These
three consecutive jobs W;X; Y form a block with total processing time 15M ,
to ensure that a W -type job in the next block can start without waiting.
Namely. in each block I have three jobs and s(i) + s(j) + s(k) = B.
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Appendix II: Proofs in Section 4.5
Proof of Lemma 2
Consider any two processes 1; 2 that satisfy conditions (1){(3). Take
an arbitrary t0 with 0  to  t. For any given W^t r+1; : : : ; W^t0 , dene
t(W1;W2; : : : ) =
8>><>>:
1 if Wt = W^t0 ; : : : ;Wt t0+1 = W^1 ;
0 otherwise :
If t0 = 0, let t = 1 for all t. The process t is F t-measurable. Let n =P
tn t. Dawid's calibration theorem states that a coherent Bayesian is
a well-calibrated one, i.e., the long-run average proportion that an event
happens converges to the estimated probability (Dawid (1982)). According to
this theorem, for 1  almost every sequence (generated by 1 almost surely),









IfWt+1 = W^t0+1g   1(Wt+1 = W^t0+1 j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt)
i
= 0 :









IfWt+1 = W^t0+1g   2(Wt+1 = W^t0+1 j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt)
i
= 0 :
The conditions I impose make 1 a recurrent process. 1 gives positive
probability to any nite history, and for 1-almost every sequence, n diverges
to innity. The same is true for 2. Therefore, if there exists a measurable set
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W of output sequences that have positive probability under both probability









1(Wt+1 = W^t0+1 j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt)  2(Wt+1 = W^t0+1 j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt)
i
= 0 ;
or, after simplication according to conditions (1){(3),
1(W^t0+1 j W^t r+1; : : : ; W^t0) = 2(W^t0+1 j W^t r+1; : : : ; W^t0) :
As the equality must be true for arbitrary t0 and arbitrary sequences W^1; : : : ; W^t0+1,
it must be the case that 1 = 2. The argument carries over directly to the
conditional distributions.
Proof of Proposition 8
I want to show that with -probability one on the output sequence,
qt()! 1. By Bayes rule,
qt() = qt 1()  (Wt j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt 1)P
2T qt()  (Wt j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt 1)
:
Therefore, it suces to show that, with -probability one on the output
sequences W1;W2; : : : , for all  2 T ,  6= ,
lim
t!1
(Wt j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt 1)
(Wt j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt 1) = 0: (6.4)
6. Appendices 167
Let t = (Wt j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt 1) and t = (Wt j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt 1) be
the respective conditonal distributions of  and  for the histories of length
t. Consider the stochastic process zt = 2t=(t + t).
Note that zt = E[ j Ft] where the expectation is taken under the
probability measure 1
2
( + ). By Levy's martingale convergence theorem




almost everywhere to z, a Radon-Nikodym derivative of  with respect to
1
2
( + ). As  is absolutely continuous with respect to 1
2
( + ), zt also
converges -almost everywhere to z. By lemma 2, as  and  are orthogonal,
















Proof of Lemma 3
Taking the rst order derivative of f(x) yields





1 + (2   1)x  
1   1
1 + (1   1)x:
Thus, I can compute f 0(0) = log 1
2
+2 1 and f 0(1) = log 12 + 2 112 .
Assumption 2 implies that f 0(0+) < 0 and f 0(1 ) < 0.
Since f(0) = f(1) = 0, I can easily derive that f(0+) < 0 and f(1 ) > 0.
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The continuity of f(x) on [0; 1] implies that there exists at least one x such
that f(x) = 0.
Rewrite f 0(x) as follows:





(1   1)(1  2)

x2  1 + 2   2
(1   1)(1  2)x 
1
(1   1)(1  2)
 1
:
When Assumption 1 holds, f 0(x) increases in [0; 1+2 2
2(1 1)(1 2) ] and de-
creases in [ 1+2 2
2(1 1)(1 2) ; 1]. This property ensure that x
 is unique and also
f(x) is negative when x is below x and f(x) is positive when x is above x.
Proof of Proposition 9
Firstly, dene a critical value
 =
 E [f(x(t+ 1; r)) j x(t+ 1; r) < x]
E [f(x(t+ 1; r)) j x(t+ 1; r)  x]  E [f(x(t+ 1; r)) j x(t+ 1; r) < x]






2(Wt+1 j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt)
















2(Wj+1 j Wj r+1; : : : ;Wj)




To prove that limt!+1 qt+1(1) = 1 a.e., it is equivalent to show
+1Y
t=r
1(Wt+1 j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt)
2(Wt+1 j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt) = +1 a.e..




1(Wt+1 j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt)
2(Wt+1 j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt) = +1 a.e..
Referring to the denition of 1 and 2, I know that i( j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt),






1(Wt+1 j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt)
2(Wt+1 j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt)

= +1; a.e.. (6.5)
Recall that x(t+1; r) is the conational probability that the current and




1(Wt+1 j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt)
2(Wt+1 j Wt r+1; : : : ;Wt)

= log
1 + (2   1)x(t+ 1; r)
1 + (1   1)x(t+ 1; r) + x(t+ 1; r) log
1
2
= f(x(t+ 1; r))





E [f(x(t+ 1; r))] = +1; (6.6)
It is easy to compute the following:
E [f(x(t+ 1; r))]
= E [f(x(t+ 1; r)) j x(t+ 1; r)  x] (x(t+ 1; r)  x)
+ E [f(x(t+ 1; r)) j x(t+ 1; r) < x] (x(t+ 1; r) < x)
Lemma 2 suggests that E [f(x(t+ 1; r)) j x(t+ 1; r)  x]  0 and
[f(x(t+ 1; r)) j x(t+ 1; r) < x] < 0. Thus,  2 (0; 1]. E [f(x(t+ 1; r))] > 0
is equivalent to (x(t + 1; r)  x) > . Therefore, I can show that when
(x(t + 1; r)  x) > ; 8t  r, Equation 6.6 holds and I prove result 1) in
this proposition.
Similar arguments can be extend to prove result 2).
